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. The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments
from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more
extensive and less susceptible of precise limits, it can with the greater
facility, mask under complicated and indirect measures, the encroach-
ments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments.'
I Introduction
The separation of powers doctrine is fundamental to our constitutional
system of government. It exhibits both the genius of the Framers and their
concern for protecting individual due process rights. By maintaining integrity
among the branches, the checks and balances envisioned by the Framers are
ensured of proper operation; by appreciating the structural limitations within
each pillar of the national government, the election of public officials and the
vindication of civil rights and liberties through the judicial system are fully
realized. Indeed, the purpose of the separation of powers doctrine has been
described as serving "both to protect the role of the independent judiciary
within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government, and to safeguard
litigants' right to have claims decided before judges who are free from poten-
tial domination by other branches of government."2 In short, the doctrine is
"basic and vital" to ensuring individual liberty, "namely, to preclude a com-
mingling of the[ ] essentially different powers of government in the same
hands.
3
This Article addresses the separation of powers doctrine in the context
ofthe increasing trend of Congress to legislate in areas that encroach upon the
inherent adjudicatory powers of Article III courts. In so legislating, Congress
is testing the boundaries where the legislative and judicial powers intersect.
For example, one unsuccessful attempt was the passage of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).4 Congress purported to provide
greater protection to religious rights pursuant to section five ofthe Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by subjecting any regulation
substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion to strict scrutiny.6 The
1. THE FEDERAISTNO. 48, at 251 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
2. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
3. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516,530 (1933) (citation omitted).
4. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat 1488 (codified
at42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000bb to 2000bb-4) (1994), declared unconstitutional by City ofBoeme
v. lores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
5. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
6. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, § 3,107 Stat at 1488-89 (stating that regula-
tion must be "in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and "the least restrictive
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United States Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional four years
later, reasoning that Congress only has the power to enforce the provisions of
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, and not to determine what consti-
tutes a constitutional violation of it.
7
Another recent congressional effort to encroach upon the adjudicatory
powers of Article I courts was the enactment of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act,8 which fashioned major changes to substantive
federal criminal law. For example, one provision of that act amends the fed-
eral habeas corpus laws to read:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -
(1) resulted ina decision that was contrary to, or involved anunreason-
able application of; clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resultedinadecisionthatwasbasedonanunreasonabledetermina-
lion of the facts in light of the evidence presented inthe State court
proceeding.9
The statute arguably places limitations on a federal court's adjudication of a
constitutional right.10 During a recent en banc argument before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, one judge voiced his concern
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest"). The Constitution expressly
protects the free exercise of religion. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof").
7. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (observing that design and
text of section five are inconsistent with Congress's decreeing substance of Fourteenth Amend-
ment's restrictions on states). Many commentators also have expressed this view. See, e.g.,
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994) (arguing that Religious Freedom Act is
unconstitutional because it violates principles of religious freedom and exceeds bounds of
federal authority).
8. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat 1214
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 8, 15, 18,22,28,40,42, 50 U.S.C.).
9. Id. § 104, 110 Stat. at 1219 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
10. Although the Constitution expressly provides a right not to have the writ of habeas
corpus suspended under most circumstances, the right to habeas corpus relief itself is statutory
in nature. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it"); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq. (1996) (codifying power to grant writ of habeas corpus).
However, the rights adjudicated in federal habeas corpus petitions over criminal convictions are
rights substantively derived from the Constitution, such as the right to effective assistance of
counsel found in the Sixth Amendment See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("[T]he accused shall
enjoy the right to... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence").
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that the language in section (d)(1) appeared to regulate a court's adjudicatory
function by forcing district courts to apply congressionally determined stan-
dards."
Against this backdrop, this Article argues that Congress violates the
separation of powers doctrine when it places restrictions on the equitable
remedies afforded by Article III courts that adjudicate federal constitutional
rights. However, Congress does not violate the separation of powers when it
similarly limits the available equitable remedies for federal statutory rights.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) unmistakably illustrates
Congress's attempt to limit the equitable powers of Article I courts when a
constitutional right is at stake. 2 In an unprecedented and manifold manner,
the PLRA altered the landscape of prison conditions litigation in the federal
courts. Prison conditions lawsuits typically are brought on behalf of prisoners
alleging federal constitutional violations, such as due process violations, and
equal protection violations, or violations of the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.13 This Article focuses on provisions that immediately
terminate any prospective equitable relief previously ordered by a federal
court in prison conditions cases. It concludes that these provisions violate the
separation of powers doctrine because they impermissibly invade the inherent
equitable powers of Article I courts.
Part II examines the PLRA's major provisions and its limited legislative
history to ascertain the intent behind the passage of this controversial statute.
In passing the act, Congress was motivated primarily by two desires: to
discourage the filing of frivolous prisoner lawsuits and to curtail the power of
the Article I judiciary in prison conditions cases. However, the floor debates
also reveal that "serious constitutional problems" raised by the statute's pro-
visions were acknowledged but never fully addressed.
Part III evaluates court decisions that have addressed the constitutionality
of the immediate termination provisions. This part focuses primarily on two
of the three separation of powers challenges - reopening final judgments and
11. See Matteo v. Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 898 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc). The parties argued
this case en bane before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on November
23, 1998.
12. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections).
13. Due process protections stem from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, which proscribe the deprivation "of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV, § 1. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments also guarantee equal protection of the laws. See Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181,
182 n.1 (1976) (explaining that Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment "encompasses equal
protection principles"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Eighth Amendment proscribes the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
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prescribing rules of decision. Both theories have achieved mixed success in
the courts, mostly because they suffer from definitional uncertainties and a
loose-fitting analogy.
Finally, Part IV discusses the third challenge based on a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine - impermissibly invading the inherent equitable
powers of Article I courts when they are adjudicating constitutional rights.
Although the arguments are compelling, no court has yet adopted this theory.
This Article seeks to strengthen this theory of the separation of powers doc-
trine by presenting an original analysis ofthe text, history, and structure ofthe
Constitution. Applying that analysis to the PLRA immediate termination pro-
visions reveals why the provisions exemplify an impermissible constraint on
a constitutional court's inherent equitable powers when they are adjudicating
a constitutional right.
I. The PLRA and Its Legislative History
Federal courts have long utilized consent decrees as a means of accom-
plishing institutional reform after litigation has revealed a need for court inter-
vention.14 Using their equitable powers,"5 federal courts have ordered affirma-
tive action measures to remedy discriminatory employment practices, 6 deseg-
14. Consent decrees are formal agreements between the parties that take the form of a
binding contract:
Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has
produced agreement on their precise terms. The parties waive their right to litigate
the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and
inevitable risk of litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies
a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties
each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with the litiga-
tion.
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673,681-82 (1971). Consent decrees also are binding
orders of the court. One of the critical items over which parties have bargained is the signature
of an Article Ilijudge. This seemingly ministerial act is the very essence of federal enforcement
of the decree because no order is enforceable without this signature. A consent decree sanc-
tioned by the court in this manner becomes "cloaked with federalness," embodying the expecta-
tions of both parties that future administration of the decree would take place before the
auspices of a federal court.
15. A court implicates its equitable powers when it renders a decision according to prin-
ciples of fairness. For example, when the common law remedy of monetary damages fails to
redress the harm adequately, the court may issue an injunction or decree that "equitably" orders
a party to act or to refrain from acting in a certain manner. See infra Part IV.C (explaining roots
of equity jurisdiction).
16. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 580-83 (1984)
(holding that district court exceeded its powers by entering injunction requiring white employ-
ees to be laid off when otherwise applicable seniority system would have laid off black employ-
ees with less seniority).
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regated exclusive student bodies," and, of course, ameliorated unconstitu-
tional conditions in prisons."' After entering a consent decree, courts continue
to monitor the institution's reform efforts by retaining jurisdiction over the
case. Consequently, they exercise complete equitable discretion to enforce, to
modify, or to terminate the decree should circumstances warrant such relief,19
or even to hold parties in contempt for fiiling to comply with the decree.2'
For example, since 1978, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York has formulated a variety of decrees to remedy condi-
tions of confinement in the New York City jails." The city jails were the
subject of seven class action lawsuits.' The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit observed that "[t]hese decrees have generated ajudicially administered
structure comprising over ninety related court orders and extending to more
than thirty discrete areas of prison administration."'tr
17. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,281-89 (1977) (upholding district courts
plan of remedial education programs for schoolchildren formerly subjected to segregation).
18. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685-88 (1978) (holding that district court
could limit confinement in isolation to thirty day maximum and holding that evidence supported
finding that isolation cell conditions violated prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment).
19. "[T]he power of a court of equity to modify an injunction in adaptation to changed
conditions," even if the injunction "was entered by consent," is "inherent in the jurisdiction of
the chancery. A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always
to adaptation as events may shape the need." United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114
(1932); see also Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367,382 (1992) (reaffirming
principle that federal court has power under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to modify consent decree in
response to significant change either in factual condition or in law).
20. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314-20 (1967) (stating that
court orders must be obeyed unless and until defendant obtains judicial modification or dissolu-
tion of terms); see also Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane)
[hereinafter Benjamin M1 ("A plaintiff willing to settle constitutional claims by way of a consent
decree seeks the assurance that, if the defendant fails to fulfill its agreed obligations, those
obligations will be enforceable through the court's exercise of its contempt power.").
21. SeeBenjaminv. Jacobson, 124F.3d 162,165 (2d Cir. 1997),vacated on other grounds
en bane, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Benjamin I].
22. See id.
23. Id. Specifically, the decrees:
[E]nsure that detainee mail and property are handled properly, and that procedures
in concert with constitutional protections are followed during detainee cell and
body searches. On an institutional level, the Consent Decrees seek to maintain the
physical plant of the jails in a condition safe for human habitation. They mandate
that attention be given to vermin and insect control, sanitation, maintenance and
refuse removal. Other provisions govern food services to the detainees and ensure
that the detainees are adequately fed while in custody, with food that is prepared
and served in a sanitary environment
Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935F. Supp. 332,337 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd inpar rev'd inpar and
remanded, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane).
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The arena of prison conditions litigation is rife with systemic problems.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act is a significant step towards exercising
some supervision over a situation that practitioners, policymakers, and the
courts agree is empirically spinning out of control.2 4 In response, Congress,
enacted the PLRA as Title VIII ofthe Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and
Appropriations Act of 1996,' which President Clinton signed into law on
April 26, 1996.26 Myriad PLRA provisions create unprecedented limitations
on prison conditions litigation. For example, the statute limits prison condi-
tions litigation as follows: it bars federal courts from entering prisoner release
orders unless a three-judge court previously has entered an order for less
intrusive relief;2 it deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over
civil actions for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody if there
is no showing of prior physical injury; it generally requires prisoners who
seek to bring civil actions or appeals in forma pauperis to pay the full amount
of the applicable filing fee prior to a determination on the petition;' it bars a
prisoner from bringing a civil action or appeal if the prisoner has on three or
more prior occasions brought an action or appeal in a federal court that was
dismissed on grounds that the action was frivolous, malicious, or failed to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted;3 ° and it permits a court to
revoke unvested earned good time credit if the court finds that the action was
filed for a malicious or harassing purpose, or if the prisoner commits perjury
or otherwise presents false evidence to the court.31
24. See, e.g., Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industbial Complex, ATLANTIC MONTBLY, Dec.
1998 at 51 (discussing political, economic, and social conditions of prison systems nationwide).
25. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
26. Enacted as part of another act, the PLRA effectively escaped critical review and mark-
up by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. See 142 CONG. REC. S2285-02, at S2296
(daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("Although a version of the PLRA was
introduced as a free-standing bill and referred to the Judiciary Committee, it was never the
subject of a committee mark-up, and there is no Judiciary Committee report explaining the
proposal. The PLRA was the subject of a single hearing in the Judiciary Committee, hardly the
type of thorough review that a measure of this scope deserves."); 141 CONG. REc. H14078-02,
at H14106 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep. Conyers) ("None of these [prison
litigation reform and truth in sentencing] provisions belong in an appropriations bill. These are
matters clearly within the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee and I am distressed that the
Judiciary Committee's jurisdiction has been subverted in this way.").
27. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, § 802(a),
Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat 1321 (1996), codified at28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1996)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626).
28. See id. § 803(d), 110 Stat at 1321-72 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1997e); id. § 806, 110
Stat, at 1321-75 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
29. See id. § 804(a), 110 Stat at 1321-73 to 1321-74 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1915).
30. See id. § 804(d), 110 Stat at 1321-74 to 1321-75 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1915).
31. See id. § 809(a), 110 Stat at 1321-76 (inserting 28 U.S.C. § 1932).
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This Article addresses the PLRA immediate termination provisions,
which generally mandate that any prospective relief 32 granted in a "civil
action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary
to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plain-
tiffS.133 Furthermore, any prospective relief granted by a court is subject to
narrow tailoring, which requires the court to find "that such relief is narrowly
drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Fed-
eral right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation
ofthe Federal right."34 Consequently, a party is entitled to immediate termina-
tion of any prospective relief that was granted in the absence of these
findings.3' A party is also entitled to termination of prospective relief when
the court does not make "written findings based on the record that prospective
relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Fed-
eral right, 3 6 and the proposed relief is otherwise narrowly tailored as previ-
ously defined.
Surprisingly, for legislation that makes such marked changes in an area
of intense federal litigation, there was little legislative debate elucidating the
meaning and intended interpretation of these provisions. In the one published
House Conference Report, the statute is purported "to limit the remedies for
prison condition lawsuits and discourage frivolous and abusive prison law-
suits."'  The report also included the following passage describing the imme-
diate termination provisions:
Section 802 amends 18 U.S.C. § 3626 to require that prison condition
remedies do not go beyondthe measures necessaryto remedy federal rights
32. "Prospective relief' is defined as "all relief other than compensatory monetary
damages." Id. § 802(gX7 ), 110 Stat. at 1321-70 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626). The statute also
states that "the term 'relief' means all relief in any form that may be granted or approved by the
court, and includes consent decrees but does not include private settlement agreements." Id.
§ 802(g)(9), 110 Stat. at 1321-70. Thus, consent decrees are a form of prospective relief.
33. Id. § 802(aXl)(A), 110 Stat at1321-66 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626).
34. Id.
35. See id. § 802(b)(2), 110 Stat at 1321-68.
36. Id. § 802(b)(3), 110 Stat. at 1321-68. When enacted, this section read "current or
ongoing" (emphasis added). Effective November 26, 1997, Congress amended this section to
read "current and ongoing." See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary
and Related Agencies Appropriates Act, 1998 Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 123(aX2), 111 Stat. 2440,
2470 (1997) (emphasis added).
Procedurally, a party makes such a motion for immediate termination (1) two years after
the date the court granted the prospective relief; (2) one year after the date the court has entered
an order denying termination of prospective relief under the PLRA, or (3) in the case of an order
issued on or before April 26, 1996, two years after that date. See PLRA § 802(b)(1), 110 Stat
at 1321-67 to 1321-68 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626).
37. 141 CONCG. REC. H13874-01, atH13928 (daily ed. Dec. 4,1995) (H. CoIF. REP.No.
104-378).
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violations and that public safety and criminal justice needs are given
appropriate weight in framing such remedies. Specifically, the section
places limits on the type of prospective relief available to inmate litigants.
The relief is generally limited to the minimum necessary to correct the
violation of a federal right. ... Prior consent decrees are made terminable
upon the motion of either party, and can be continued only if the court
finds that the imposed relief is necessary to correct the violation of the
federal right8
One of the bill's main sponsors, Senator Spencer Abraham (R.-Mich.),
identified three "obstacles" created by the federal judiciary that prevented
state and local governments from effectively managing their prison systems.
He first complained that federal judicial orders were unnecessarily raising the
costs of running prisons, thereby undermining the legitimacy and the punitive
and deterrent effects of prison sentences.39 Because the cost of prison man-
agement is borne by state and local taxpayers, Senator Abraham declared that
"people deserve to keep their tax dollars or have them spent on projects they
approve. They deserve better than to have their money spent, on keeping
prisoners in conditions some Federal judge feels are desirable, although not
required by any provision of the Constitution or any law.u
40
Senator Abraham next criticized orders mandating prison population caps
to relieve severe overcrowding because they resulted in the premature release
of convicts. 41 Senator Orrin Hatch (R.-Utah) commented that "[a]s of January
1994, twenty-four corrections agencies reported having court-mandated popu-
lations caps" and, in his opinion, it was "past time to slam shut the revolving
door on the prison gate and to put the key safely out of reach of overzealous
Federal courts."42 The overriding sentiment in Congress was that "[flederal
judges have been attempting to micromanage correctional facilities throughout
the country."
43
And finally, Senator Abraham blamed federal court orders for the accom-
panying flood of prisoner lawsuits, which devoured enormous amounts of time
38. Id.
39. See 141 CoNG. REc. S14312, at 514316 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Abraham); see also 141 CONG. REC. S14408-01,at S14419 (daily ed. Sept. 27,1995) (statement
of Sen. Abraham) ("By interfering with the fulfillment of this punitive function, the courts are
effectively seriously undermining the entire criminal justice system.").
40. See 141 CONG. REc. S14408-01, at S14419 (daily ed. Sept 27, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Abraham) (describing "murderous early releases").
41. See 141 CoNG. REc. S14312-03, at S14316 (daily ed. Sept 26,1995) (statement of
Sen. Abraham).
42. 141 CONG. REc. S14408-01, at S14418 (daily ed. Sept 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
43. 141 CONG. REc. H14078-02, at H14106 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Canady).
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and resources.44 Indeed, Senator Robert Dole (R.-Kan.) complained about the
"alarming explosion" of frivolous prisoner lawsuits: "Frivolous lawsuits...
tie up the courts, waste valuable legal resources, and affect the quality of
justice enjoyed by law-abiding citizens."45 Numerous, often humorous, anec-
dotes of frivolous lawsuits also peppered the floor debates. 6
With respect to the immediate termination provisions, Senator Abraham
stated that the PLRA:
[F]orbids courts from entering orders forprospective relief(such as regulating
food temperatures) unless the order is necessary to correct violations of
individualplaintiffs' Federalrights. It also requires thatthe reliefbe narrowly
drawn andbe the least intrusive means ofprotecting the Federal rights. And
it directs courts to give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public
safety or the operation of the criminal justice system caused by the relief.
It also provides that any party can seek to have a court decree ended
after 2 years, and that the court will order it ended unless there is still a con-
stitutional violation that needs to be corrected.47
44. See 141 CONG. REc. S14312-03, at S14316 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Abraham).
45. 141 CONG. REC. S14408-01, at S14413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dole). The National Association of Attorneys General, writing to Senator Dole in support of
the PLRA, stated:
Although numbers are not available for all of the states, 33 states have estimated that
together inmate civil rights suits cost them at least $54.5 million annually. Extrapolat-
ing this figure to all 50 states, we estimate that inmate civil rights suits cost states at
least $81.3 million per year. Experience at both the federal and state level suggests
that, while all of these cases are not frivolous, more than 95 percent of inmate civil
rights suits are dismissed without the inmate receiving anything. Although occasional
meritorious claims absorb state resources, nonetheless, we believe the vast majority
of the $81.3 million figure is attributable to the non-meritorious cases.
Id. at S14418.
46. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S14611-01, atS14627-28 (daily ed. Sept 29,1995) (state-
ment of Sen. Reid) (describing inmate complaints including complaints about athletic shoe
brand names and creamy versus chunky peanut butter). The Congressional Record includes the
following list of the "Top 10 Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits Nationally": Inmate claimed $1 million
in damages because his ice cream had melted; inmate alleged that being forced to listen to his
unit manager's country and western music constituted cruel and unusual punishment; inmate
sued because the piece of cake on his dinner tray was "hacked up"; inmate sued because he was
served chunky instead of smooth peanut butter, two prisoners sued to force taxpayers to pay for
sex-change surgeries while they were in prison; inmate sued for $100 million alleging he was
told that he would be making $29.40 within three months when he only made $21.00; inmate
claimed that his rights were violated because he was forced to send packages via UPS rather
than U.S. mail; inmate sued demanding LA Gear or Reebok "Pumps" instead of Converse;
inmate sued 66 defendants alleging that unidentified physicians implanted mind control devices
in his head; and death row inmate sued corrections officials for taking away his Gameboy
electronic game. See id. at S14629.
47. 141 CoNG. REc. S14408-01, at S14419 (daily ed. Sept 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Abraham).
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He then declared that:
[No longer will prison administration be turned over to Federal judges for
the indefinite future for the slightest reason. Instead, the State [or the appro-
priate federal agency] will be able to run prisons as they see fit unless there
is a constitutionalviolation, inwhich case a narrowlytailored order to correct
the violation may be entered.'
In sum, supporters of the PLRA hoped that the legislation would "help
restore balance to prison conditions litigation and... ensure that Federal court
orders are limited to remedying actual violations of prisoners' rights, not let-
ting prisoners out ofjail."'49 Characterizing the PLRA's provisions as "guide-
lines," Senator Dole also hoped that the provisions would "restrain liberal
Federal judges who see violations of constitutional rights in every prisoner
complaint and who have used these complaints to micromanage State and local
prison systems.
0 °
Supporters ofthe PLRA evidently sought to address two perceived evils:
(1) the enormous costs, both in time and money, imposed on the federal courts
system by the filing of frivolous prisoner lawsuits, and (2) the meddling of
federal courts in the business of prison administration. Congress viewed the
federal courts as overstepping their institutional role and encouraging prison-
ers to continue filing needless, often frivolous, lawsuits. It believed that the
problem lay in the courts' issuance of broad remedial orders, over which they
retained jurisdiction and through which they micromanaged prisons."' The
principle that individual taxpayers should be able to resort to a democratically
elected, and thus accountable, state or local legislature in determining whether
and how they should continue to bear the burden ofpaying for continued prison
administration circumscribed these two concerns. For Congress, the proper
time had come to divest the federal courts of their heretofore substantial role
in managing prison conditions.
The timing of these statements illuminates Congress's attitude of disdain
towards the federal judiciary and the ensuing groundswell of prison conditions
litigation. With a Democratic president in the White House making appoint-
ments to the federal bench, Republicans felt renewed vigor to challenge the
48. Id.
49. Id. at S14418 (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also 141 CONG. REC. H14078-02, at
H14106 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep. Canady) ("It's time we restored some bal-
ance and common sense to the judiciary's handling of prison litigation.").
50. 141 CoNG. REc. S14611-01, at S14626 (daily ed. Sept 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dole).
51. Interestingly, despite all this concern over the federal courts, the PLRA presumably
applies equally to relief entered by a state court based upon claims arising under the Constitu-
tion or federal law. Cf PLRA § 802(d), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat 1321, 1321-68 (1996)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626) ("The limitations on remedies in this section shall not apply to
relief entered by a State court based solely upon claims arising under State law.").
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nomination of perceived "liberal" judges after the 1994 mid-term elections
placed Republicans in the majority of both houses of Congress for the first
time in forty years.' The GOP Senate could flex its muscle because it is
constitutionally empowered to confirm (or deny) all federal judicial nomina-
tions.53
The media was also casting aspersions upon federal judges for their
apparently "liberal" rulings. The PLRA floor debates specifically condemned
efforts by Judge Norma L. Shapiro of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to
impose a population cap on Philadelphia's prisons because of overcrowding.54
Another example of perceived judicial excess that inflamed the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee was the January 1996 ruling by Judge Harold Baer, Jr. ofthe
Southern District of New York (a Clinton appointee), granting a criminal
defendant's suppression motion. The ruling would have been routine but for
the quantity of drugs at issue."
Nonetheless, the PLRA was not without its detractors.56 In particular,
Associate Attorney General John Schmidt, who had appeared before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee at its only hearing on the legislation, testified that the
immediate termination provisions "would raise serious constitutional prob-
52. See, e.g., Dan Baz,A Historic Republican Triumph: GOP Captures Congress; Party
Controls Both Housesfor First Time Since '50s, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1994, at Al.
53. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (President "shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law").
54. See 141 CONG. REc. S14408-01, at S14414 (daily ed. Sept. 27,1995) (statement of
Sen. Dole) (discussing Philadelphia's court-ordered prison cap that put thousands of violent
criminals back on city streets, often with disastrous consequences). Professor John Diiulio has
pointed out "Federal Judge Norma Shapiro has single-handedly decriminalized property and
drug crimes in the City of Brotherly Love .... Judge Shapiro has done what the city's orga-
nized crime bosses never could; namely, turn the town into a major smuggling port"); see also
Sarah B. Vandenbraak, No Room at the Jail, USA TODAY, Aug. 17,1995, at 11A (reporting on
crimes committed by prisoners whom Judge Shapiro released).
55. See, e.g., Life Tenure for a Reason, WASL POST, Mar. 26, 1996, atA12 (discussing
furor raised by Judge Baer's conclusion that police search was illegal and excluding eighty
pounds of heroin and cocaine). Amidst a national outcry calling for his impeachment, Judge
Baer vacated his earlier ruling on a motion for reconsideration and ultimately denied the
defendant's motion to suppress. See United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.),
vacating 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
56. See, e.g., 142 CoNG. REC. S2285-02, at S2297 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Simon) (raising "strong concerns" regarding PLRA); id. at 52296 (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (expressing "deep concern" regarding PLRA); 141 CONG. REC. H14078-02, at
H14106 (daily ed. Dee. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (warning of negative impact on
federal judiciary); 141 CONG. IEc. S14611-01, at S14628 (daily ed. Sept. 29,1995) (statement
of Sen. Biden) (sharing concerns regarding PLRA).
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lems" on due process and separation of powers grounds,"1 a prediction that has
been borne out through the caselaw.5 8 While believing that most of the
provisions contained in the PLRA ultimately would withstand constitutional
scrutiny, he identified two problems with the PLRA's immediate termination
provisions:
First, the [statute] apparentlylimits prospective reliefto cases involving
ajudicial finding of a violation of a federal right. This could create avery
substantial impediment to the settlement of prison conditions suits...
because the defendants might effectively have to concede that they have
caused ortoleratedunconstitutional conditions intheir facilities inorderto
secure judicial approval of the settlement This would result in litigation
that no one wants, ifthe defendants were unwilling to make such a damag-
ing admission, and could requirejudicial Resolution of matters that would
otherwisebe more promptly resolvedby the parties in a mutuallyagreeable
manner.
Second, ... [iln some cases the unconstitutional conditions on which
relief is premised will not be corrected within this timeframe, resulting in
a need forfurtherprison conditionslitigation. The JusticeDepartment and
other plaintiffs, would have to refile cases in order to achieve the objec-
tives of the original order, and defendants would have the burden of
responding to these new suits.... This point applies with particular force
where the new litigation will revisit matters that have alreadybeen adjudi-
cated and resolved in an earlier judgment.59
In the end, these entreaties were to no avail, and the PLRA became law
in April 1996.60 What is apparent from the legislative history, however, is the
complete absence of any substantive debate about the constitutional issues
raised by the PLRA or any detailed section-by-section analysis ofthe bill. At
best, the legislative history presents paraphrases of the statute's actual lan-
guage and vague, general descriptions of what the provisions are intended to
accomplish.6' Moreover, Congress devoted no extensive discussion to any
potential separation of powers or other constitutional implications for the fed-
57. 142 CONG. REC. S2285-02, at S2297 (daily ed. Mar. 19,1996). The hearing was held
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 27, 1995.
58. See discussion and notes infra Parts III- IVA (presenting cases illustrating constitu-
tional problems).
59. 142 CONG. REc. S2285-02, at 52300 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (testimony of John
Schmidt).
60. See Omnibus Consolidated Recissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-134, 110 Stat 1321 (1996).
61. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S14312-03, at S14316 (daily ed. Sept. 26,1995) (statement
of Sen. Abraham) (stating that purpose of PLRA is to "return sanity and State control to our
prison systems ... by limiting judicial remedies in prison cases and by limiting frivolous pris-
oner litigation").
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eral courts or the federal system. The Supreme Court has suggested that a
congressional decision to legislate in an area after having given "substantial
consideration to the constitutionality of the Act, is of course reason to respect
the congressional conclusion."'62 Congress should be accorded no such pre-
sumption with respect to the PLRA.
L. Challenging the Immediate Termination Provisions
What are the "serious constitutional problems" raised by the immediate
termination provisions? Since the enactment of the PLRA, state attorneys
general nationwide have been utilizing the immediate termination provisions
to terminate existing consent decrees.63 In response, plaintiffs' have chal-
lenged the PLRA immediate termination provisions as a violation of: (1) the
separation of powers doctrine; (2) their due process rights guaranteed under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments;65 (3) their equal protection rights
guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments;' and (4) the Tenth
62. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,61 (1982).
63. See, e.g., Benjamin IL 172 F.3d 144, 163-65 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane); Hadix v.
Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 943 n.3 (6th Cir.) (dictum), cert denied sub nom. Hadix v. McGinnis,
118 S. Ct. 2368 (1998); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424, 1426 (1lth Cir. 1997), cert
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2375 (1998); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 658-60
(1st Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 2366 (1998); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081,1090-91
(8th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 2374 (1998); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 374-75 (4th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2460 (1997); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp.2d 855, 867-69
(S.D. Tex. 1999); Vazquez v. Carver, 18 F. Supp.2d 503, 507-09 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (mem.);
Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 11 F. Supp. 2d 586,600-01 (E.D. Pa. 1998), affid on other
grounds sub nom. Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1999); Green v.
Peters,No. 71 C 1403,1997 WL 769458, at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5,1997) (mem.), reconsider-
ation granted in part and denied in part on other grounds, 1998 WL 246487 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27,
1998) (mem.); Thompson v. Gomez,993 F. Supp. 749,764 (N.D. Cal. 1997); James v. Lash, 965
F. Supp. 1190,1198 (N.D. Ind. 1997); Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F. Supp. 397,405 (N.D.
Ind. 1997).
64. Hereinafter, "plaintiffs" will refer to parties who originally brought suit alleging con-
stitutional violations in the underlying litigation and who are challenging the PLRA.
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall any person... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law"); ia. amend. XIV, § I ("nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"). The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution also has been interpreted as containing an equal protec-
tion component See Matthews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181,182 n.1 (1976) (explaining that Due
Process Clause of Fifth Amendment "encompasses equal protection principles"); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the
same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636, 638 n.2 (1975) (observing that Fifth Amendment forbids discrimination "violative of due
process").
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Amendment.67 The merits of the latter three challenges, while worthy of
extensive discussion,68 are beyond the scope of this Article. This Article will
focus only on the separation of powers issues raised by the immediate termi-
nation provisions.
Plaintiffs have advanced three theories contending that the immediate
termination provisions violate the separation of powers doctrine. First, plain-
tiffs maintain that the immediate termination provisions impermissibly reopen
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
68. The plaintiffs advance three theories explaining why the immediate termination pro-
visions violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. First, plaintiffs
contend that because the consent decree is a final judgment, they have vested property rights in
the consent decree that are taken without due process as a result of the immediate termination.
Second, they argue that because the consent decree constitutes an enforceable contract, due
process limits the extent to which the federal government can interfere with those contractual
rights. Third, plaintiffs maintain that the statute operates retroactively in violation of due
process; that is, that no rational legislative purpose justifies the retroactive application of the
legislation to their consent decrees in violation of due process. See Benjamin 11, 172 F.3d 144,
163-65 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane); Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 943 n.3 (6th Cir.) (dictum),
cert denied sub nom. Hadix v. McGinnis, 118 S. Ct. 2368 (1998); Dougan v. Singletary, 129
F.3d 1424, 1426 (11th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 2375 (1998); Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 658-60 (1st Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 2366
(1998); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1090-91 (8th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct.
2374 (1998); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 374-75 (4th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct.
2460 (1997); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp.2d 855,867-69 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Vazquez v. Carver,
18 F. Supp.2d 503, 507-09 (ED. Pa. 1998) (mem.); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 11 F.
Supp. 2d 586, 600-01 (E.D. Pa. 1998), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Imprisoned Citizens
Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1999); Green v. Peters, No. 71 C 1403, 1997 WL
769458, at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5,1997) (mer.), reconsideration granted inpart and denied
in part on other grounds, 1998 WL 246487 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 1998) (mem.); Thompson v.
Gomez, 993 F. Supp. 749,764 (N.D. Cal. 1997); James v. Lash, 965 F. Supp. 1190,1198 (N.D.
Ind. 1997); Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F. Supp. 397,405 (N.D. Ind. 1997).
Equal protection challenges come in two forms. The plaintiffs initially assert that the
immediate termination provisions single out the class of prison inmates and burden their
fundamental right of access to the courts. Alternatively, they argue that the legislation fails
under a rational basis review. See, e.g., Benjamin 11, 172 F.3d at 151-54; Ridge, 169 F.3d at
189; Hadix, 133 F.3d at 943 n.3 (dictum); Dougan, 129 F.3d at 1427; Rouse, 129 F.3d at 659-
61; Gavin, 122 F.3d at 1089-90; Plyler, 100 F.3d at 373, Ruiz, 37 F. Supp2d at 869; Green,
1997 WL 769458, at *13; Thompson, 993 F. Supp. at765;James, 965 F. Supp. at 1197;Jensen,
958 F. Supp. at 404.
The Tenth Amendment argument has been attempted in only one case to date. The
argument contends that the immediate termination provisions interfere with the ability of state
governments to enter into binding settlement agreements that will be enforceable in the future.
See Green, 1997 WIL 769458, at *15. Finding that the statute neither compels nor prevents
states from acting with regard to prison litigation, the court concluded that the Tenth Amend-
mentwas not implicated by the PLRA. See id. at *16.
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final judgments of federal courts.69 Second, they argue that these provisions
prescribe rules of decision to federal courts in pending cases, thereby usurping
their adjudicatory function." Finally, in the argument of most interest here,
they assert that the provisions impermissibly invade the federal courts' inher-
ent equitable powers." This Part will critique the first two theories, ultimately
concluding that they do not adequately embrace the precise separation of
powers violation committed by the PLRA immediate termination provisions.
The merits of the plaintiffs' third theory will be addressed in the next part of
the Article.
69. See, e.g., Benjamin I, 172 F.3d 144, 151-59 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane); Imprisoned
Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178, 183-87 (3d Cir. 1999); Taylor v. United States, 143
F.3d 1178,1181 (9th Cir.), reh 'g en banc granted and op. withdrawn, 158 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir.
1998), and affd on other grounds as moot, Nos. 97-16069 & 97-16071,1999 WL402748 (9th
Cir. June 18, 1999); Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940,942 (6th Cir. 1998) (dictum), cert denied
sub nom. Hadix v. McGinnis, 118 S. Ct. 2368 (1998); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424,
1426 (1lth Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct 2375 (1998); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 656-57 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2366 (1998); Gavin v.
Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1085 (8th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 2374 (1998); Plyler v.
Moore, 100 F.3d 365 371(4th Cir. 1996); Ruiz v. Johnson, 27 F. Supp.2d 855, 871-72, (S.D.
Tex. 1999); Green v. Peters, No. 71 C 1403, 1997 WL 769458, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1997)
(mem.), reconsideration granted in part and denied in part on other grounds, 1998 WL246487
(N.D. Il. Apr. 27, 1998) (mem.); James v. Lash, 965 F. Supp. 1190, 1194 (N.D. Ind. 1997);
Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F. Supp. 397,400 (N.D. Ind. 1997).
70. See, e.g., Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178, 186-89 (3d Cir. 1999);
Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir.), reh 'g en banc granted and op. with-
drawn, 158 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1998), and afdon other grounds asmoot, Nos. 97-16069 &
97-16071,1999 WL 402748 (9th Cir. June 18,1999); Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940,943 (6th
Cir.) (dictum), cert denied sub nom. Hadix v. McGinnis, 118 S. Ct 2368 (1998); Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 657-58 (1st Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct.
2366 (1998); Gavin, v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1085 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
2374 (1998); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365,372 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2460
(1997); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp.2d 855, 878-880 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Green v. Peters, No.
71 C 1403,1997 WL 769458, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1997) (mem.), reconsideration granted
in part and denied in part on other grounds, 1998 WL 246487 (N.D. IM. 1997) (mem.). The
Second Circuit addressed this challenge in its original panel opinion. See Benjamin , 124 F.3d
162, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1997), vacated, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane). As the plaintiffs
had not renewed this challenge to the immediate termination provisions during the en bane
rehearing, the en bane court refrained from expressing any opinion on this ground when it
vacated the panel opinion. See Benjamin 11, 172 F.3d 144, 166 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane).
71. See, e.g., Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge; 169 F.3d 178, 184-88 (3d Cir. 1999);
Benjamin I, 124 F.3d 162, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1997), vacated, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (en
bane); Tyler v. Murphy, 135 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 1998); Green v. Peters, No. 71 C 1403,
1997 WL 769458 at *8 (N.D. 11. Dec. 5, 1997) (mem.), reconsideration granted in part and
denied in part on other grounds, 1998 WL 246487 (N.D. IM. Apr. 27,1998) (mer.); Thompson
v. Gomez, 993 F. Supp. 749, 763 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
IMMEDIATE TERMATJATION PROVISIONS OF THE PLRA
A. Reopening Final Judgments
In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,72 the Supreme Court held that sec-
tion 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193473 violated the separation
of powers doctrine because it legislatively required federal courts to reopen
final judgments entered before its enactment. 74 In the seven to two decision
written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court explored the textual,
historical, and structural underpinnings of the separation of powers doctrine.
Reviewing how Article III ofthe Constitution was drafted, Justice Scalia
wrote that the Framers intended federal courts to decide cases subject to
review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy and with the under-
standing that a judgment conclusively resolves the case." Conclusive resolu-
tion occurs because judicial power under Article III means that the courts have
the power to render dispositive judgments. 6 Within this hierarchy, it was the
Court's understanding that:
[T]he decision of an inferior court is not (unless the time for appeal has
expired) the final word of the department as a whole. It is the obligation of
the last court in the hierarchy that rules on the case to give effect to Congress'
latest enactment, even when that has the effect of overturning the judgment
of an inferior court.... Having achieved finality, however, ajudicial deci-
sionbecomes the last word ofthejudicial departmentwithregardto aparticu-
lar case or controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legisla-
tion that the law applicable to that very case was something other than what
the courts said it was.'
Moreover, the Court opined that Article I also unequivocally made clear that:
[Ihe doctrine of separation ofpowers is a structural safeguard rather than a
remedytobe applied only when specific harm, or risk of specific harm, canbe
identified. In its major features (ofwhichthe conclusiveness ofjudicialjudg-
ments is assuredly one) itis aprophylactic device, establishing highwalls and
clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not bejudi-
cially defensible inthe heat ofinterbranch conflict.... Separation ofpowers,
a distinctivelyAmericanpolitical doctrine, profitsfromthe advice authoredby
a distinctively American poet: Good fences make good neighbors.-
72. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1991) (codifying § 27A(b) of Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
74. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,229 (1995).
75. See id. at218.
76. See id. (referring to historical record of history to show Framers' intent that judgments
provide conclusive resolution).
77. Id. at 227.
78. Id. at 239.
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Pursuant to this understanding of separation of powers, the Court pronounced
that:
When retroactive legislation requires its own application in a case already
finally adjudicated, it does no more and no less than "reverse a determina-
tion once made, in a particular case." Our decisions stemming from
Hayburn's Case -althoughtheirpreciseholdings are not strictly applica-
ble here - have uniformly provided fair warning that such an act exceeds
the powers of Congress."°
The PLRA challenge based on a "Plaut violation" follows the Supreme
Court's rationale in Plaut: Congress has enacted retroactive legislation de-
signed to reopen and set aside, through the immediate termination provisions,
consent decrees that have become final judgments of Article I courts!"1 To
date, eight circuit courts of appeal have addressed this issue, and an additional
four district courts representing two other circuits have ruled on it.'
79. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).
80. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,225 (1995) (citations omitted) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 545 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)):
81. See, e.g., Benjamini1, 172 F.3d 144,165-66 (2d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (arguing against
immediate termination provisions of PLRA). The arguments made by the plaintiffs in Benjamin
I, which the United States Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit heard en bane, illustrate why
the PLRA may be constitutionally infirm. See Appellants' Brief at 15-23, Benjamin H (No. 96-
7957); Appellants' Reh'g Brief at 25, Benjamin ii (No. 96-7957). When making such a chal-
lenge to the PLRA, the plaintiffs assert that consent decrees are substantive entries ofjudgment,
whose time for appeal has long passed. They interpret the Plaut Court to hold that, if the time
for appeal has passed, a court's injunction is a final judgment under a separation of powers
analysis.
Relying on a line of cases beginning with Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855), the plaintiffs maintain that federal courts possess the power
to alter final prospective relief in response to new legislation, but only when Congress has the
power to alter the substantive law on which the judgment is based. In constructing this argu-
ment, the plaintiffs typically draw upon the distinction, also made in Wheeling and its progeny,
between public and private rights. Public rights involve areas that Congress has plenary power
to regulate and thus are subject to legislation altering the prospective effects of an injunction.
See, e.g., System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961) (holding that district court
abused its discretion by refusing to modify consent decree based on amendment to Railway
Labor Act). Wheeling involved the right of navigation along interstate waterways. Congress
has plenary power to regulate such a right of navigation under the Commerce Clause. See
Wheeling, 59 U.S. at 431; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have
Power To... regulate Commerce... among the several States"). By contrast, Congress does
not control private rights, such as the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
inhumane punishment, because Congress does not control the legal rights on which courts base
judgments regarding private rights. The plaintiffs! argument concludes that Congress may not
effect a change of law that reopens or vacates final injunctions based on private rights. Because
the underlying rights of the claims asserted by the plaintiffs in cases attacking the PLRA stem
from the Constitution, the plaintiffs argue that the immediate termination provisions retroac-
tively vacate final injunctive relief in constitutional cases.
82. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have found no
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The majority of courts have found no Plaut violation, essentially because
they do not agree with the plaintiffs that consent decrees are final judgments
for separation of powers purposes.'3 Relying on the same Wheeling line of
cases on which the plaintiffs had relied, one court wrote:
[TIhe consent decree at issue here provides for prospective relief and is
subject to the continuing supervisoryjurisdiction of the district court. As
such, the judgment approving the decree is not similar to ajudgment for
money damages. Rather it is akin to a final judgment granting injunctive
relief, and thus it is subject to subsequent changes in the law. 4
In contrast, a panel ofthe Ninth Circuit found a Plaut violation by distinguish-
ing the law generally affecting injunctions from the substantive law governing
the plaintiffs' claims. It concluded that Congress had not changed the sub-
stantive law upon which the parties' consent decree was entered because that
law was the Constitution itself." As a result, the court construed the immedi-
Plaut violation. See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 656-57 (1st Cir.
1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct 2366 (1998); Benjamin , 172 F.3d 144 at 161-62 (2d Cir. 1999)
(en bane); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 1999); Plyler v.
Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 520 U.S. 1277 (1997); Hadix v.
Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 942-43 (6th Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Hadix v. McGinnis, 118 S. Ct.
2368 (1998); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1085-89 (8th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S.
Ct. 2374 (1998); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424,1426 (1lth Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118
S. Ct. 2375 (1998). Unlike the other courts of appeals, a panel of the Ninth Circuit initially
found a separation of powers violation, but after a rehearing en bane, the full court simply
affirmed on other grounds, while opining in dictum that a violation would exist. See Taylor v.
United States, 143 F.3d 1178, 1181-84 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted and op. withdrawn,
158 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1998), and affid on other grounds as moot, Nos. 97-16069 & 97-
16071, 1999 WL 402748 (9th Cir. June 18,1999).
District courts in the Seventh Circuit concur with the majority of appellate courts. See
Green v. Peters, No. 71 C 1403, 1997 WL 769458, at *5-8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1997) (mem.),
reconsideration granted in part and denied in part on other grounds, 1998 WL 246487 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 29,1998) (mem.); James v. Lash, 965 F. Supp. 1190,1194-97 (N.D. Ind. 1997); Jensen
v. County of Lake, 958 F. Supp. 397,400-04 (N.D. Ind. 1997). However, one district court in
the Fifth Circuit differs from the majority of courts. See Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp.2d 855,
876,-82 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
83. See, e.g., Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 1996) (observing that unlike
final judgment, judgment providing for injunctive relief is subject to changes in law).
84. Id. at 371-72. The plaintiffs also rely on Wheeling for their argument However, they
argue that the finality of granting ajudgment does not rely on the state of the law at the time the
injunction is entered. Thus, the fact that district courts may prospectively modify or vacate their
own injunctive orders in response to changed circumstances does not compromise the finality
of those orders.
85. See Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir.) (observing that PLRA
defines scope and nature of remedy, but does not effect change in substantive law), reh 'g en
banc granted and op. withdrawn, 158 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1998) (characterizing Congress's
action as "defin[ing] the scope and nature of the remedy"), and affid on other grounds as moot,
Nos. 97-16069 & 97-16071, 1999 WL 402748 (9th Cir. June 18,1999).
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ate termination provisions as impermissibly reopening final judicial decisions
resolving constitutional claims.8 6 After a rehearing en bane, however, the
court simply affirmed on other grounds but rendered a similar disposition on
the Plaut issue in dictum.'
A panel of the Second Circuit initially struck a lone interpretive path. In
construing the effect of the immediate termination provisions, Judge Guido
Calabresi concluded that the immediate termination provisions could be read
plausibly in two ways, only one of which would raise constitutional con-
cerns.88 The first interpretation would deprive federal courts of subject matter
jurisdiction over prison consent decrees, but the decrees themselves would
still be enforceable in state courts as simple contracts. 9 The second interpre-
tation would support the plaintiffs' claim thatthe statute renders null and void
all past federal court-approved prison consent decrees unless they meet the
narrow tailoring requirement found in 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3).' ° Following
the federal courts' historical avoidance of deciding constitutional questions
whenever possible," the panel adopted the former interpretation and found
that Congress was merely changing the law regarding which forum would hear
the plaintiffs' dispute, rather than attempting to alter the plaintiffs' constitu-
tional rights.92 In reaching this result, the panel observed that the second
86. Id. at1183-84.
87. Taylor v. United States, Nos. 97-16069 & 97-16071,1999 WL 402748, at *6-9 (9th
Cir. June 18, 1999).
88. Benjamin , 124 F.3d 162, 166-68 (2d Cir. 1997), vacated, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir.
1999) (en bane).
89. See id. at 166-67. This interpretation essentially relies on the statutory definition of
"relief," which includes consent decrees, to mean remedies arising out of, or issued pursuant to
the consent decree, but not the consent decree itself. Id. at 168. The practical effect of this
analysis is that the word "termination" would mean terminating subject matter jurisdiction over
future enforcement of the consent decrees rather than the annulment of the consent decrees.
90. Id. at 167.
91. See United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,
408 (1909). Under the doctrine of constitutional doubt, federal courts must interpret statutes
to avoid "grave and doubtful constitutional questions." Id. "That doctrine enters in only 'where
a statute is susceptible of two constructions."' Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118
S. Ct. 1952,1956 (1998) (quoting Delaware &Hudson Co., 213 U.S. at 408).
92. Benjamin I, 124 F.3d at 167. Prior to Benjamin I, only one other court had adopted
this alternative interpretation. See Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Sheriff of Suffolk
County, 952 F. Supp. 869, 875 (D. Mass.), afd as modified and remanded, 129 F.3d 649 (1 st
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2366 (1998) (presuming Congress did not intend to usurp
power constitutionally forbidden it). No court to date has followed the Second Circuit's inter-
pretation, which has received much criticism. See, e.g., Denike v. Fauver, 3 F. Supp. 2d 540,
544 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding Second Circuit's construction of § 3626(b) "hard to square with
either the language of that provision or Congress's unmistakable intent when enacting it");
Green v. Peters, No. 71 C 1403, 1997 WL 769458, at *17 (mem.) (finding automatic termina-
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interpretation would raise potential separation of powers problems because it
would "strip the plaintiffs of all of the protections they negotiated into the
Consent Decrees except for those narrowly tailored to federal rights."'93 After
a rehearing en banc, a majority of the Second Circuit expressly rejected Judge
Calabresi's construction, finding that the PLRA terminated, but did not annul
or void consent decrees and further opined that there was "no basis, consistent
with fundamental principles of contract law or with the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution, on which a state court would have the power to reinstate
obligations originally imposed in the federal consent decree but terminated by
the federal court. ' 94 The court then adopted the Plaut challenge analysis of
tion provisions of PLRA constitutional but staying effect of termination provision pending
appeal), reconsideration granted in part, 1998 WL 246487 (N.D. MI1. Apr. 27, 1998) (mem.);
id. at *4 (stating that "the language of a statute cannot be molded like Silly Puddy to achieve
a constitutional result").
The original panel's interpretation also relies on the implicit assumption that state courts
are able and willing to exercise jurisdiction over such a controversy. During the en bane argu-
ment of Benjamin 1i, the topic that received the most attention was the fate of consent decrees
over which federal courts cease to exercise jurisdiction. See Audio Tape of En Bane Oral Argu-
ment (Feb. 25, 1998), Benjamin II, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 96-7957) [hereinafter
Benjamin Audio Tape] (on file with, and transcribed by, author). Federal courts frequently
make this assumption without questioning whether the state court forum would actually be
available. See, e.g., ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 520 (3d Cir. 1998)
(holding that although Telephone Consumer Protection Act is federal law, Congress's express
assigning of jurisdiction to court other than federal district court meant that access to federal
courts was barred and that lawsuits invoking statute must be brought in state courts). Indeed,
such jurisprudence presents precarious due process implications because litigants may find
themselves barred from both federal and state courts. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct.
2240, 2246 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks power to subject non-consenting states to
private suits for damages in state courts for violations of federal Fair Labor Standards Act). In
Alden, state probation officers filed suit against their employer, the State of Maine, in federal
court for violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See id. at 2246.
While the suit was pending, the Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996), in which it held that Congress lacks the power to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity from suits commenced or prosecuted in federal courts. The officers' suit was subse-
quently dismissed, and they refiled their action in state court. See Alden, 119 S. Ct at 2246.
The state trial court dismissed this second suit on sovereign immunity grounds as well, and the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. See id. The Supreme Court then affirmed the dismis-
sal of the suit, thereby barring the officers from vindicating their federal right to overtime pay
by initiating a private action in any court, federal or state. See id.
Moreover, by mirroring the subject matter restrictions and remedial limitations found in
the PLRA, recent state legislative efforts also may bar prisoners from state courts in a manner
similar to the way in which the PLRA bars them from federal courts. See, e.g., S. 5378 (N.Y.
1999) (amending Court of Claims Act by adding new subdivision concerning prison litigation
reform); S. 640 (Penn. 1997) (amending Title 42 of Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes by
adding new chapter concerning prison conditions litigation).
93. Benjamin 1, 124 F.3d at 168.
94. Benjamin I, 172 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane).
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the other circuit courts of appeal.95
As was readily apparent from the questions posed by the judges during
the en bane argument in Benjamin Hl,96 the major weaknesses in the plaintiffs'
arguments stem from at least two definitional uncertainties. First, the argu-
ment hinges upon the actual meaning of finality and whether it means the
same thing in all contexts. Second, the statute is arguably capable of being
construed as either permissibly changing the law underlying injunctions or
impermissibly attempting to modify constitutional rights. That is, one must
determine whether the nature of the remedy or the source of the underlying
right is relevant to a separation of powers analysis.
Precisely because consent decrees are subject to future enforcement,
modification, and termination by the court, their characterization as "final
judgments" is called into question. Whether a consent decree has achieved the
status of a final judgment ultimately depends on the definition of "finality."
If finality means that the time for a party to appeal a judgment has expired,
then previously entered consent decrees would become final merely by the
passage of time.' By contrast, if finality means that the court relinquishes
jurisdiction over the action, then consent decrees cannot be final because a
court may revisit the terms of the decree and modify them as the underlying
situation changes and, where circumstances warrant, terminate the decree."
However, as the appellant in Benjamin 1[ concluded at the en bane argument,
if consent decrees are deemed never to have the status of final orders, then a
serious question of inconsistency with Article Il arises: If Plaut is read to
mean that a lower federal court's power to render dispositive judgments is
intrinsic to the Article El hierarchy, then the PLRA's regulation of injunctive
relief may be fundamentally inconsistent with this structure.99
95. Id. at 162.
96. See Benjamin Audio Tape, supra note 92.
97. However, the Plaut Court may have rejected such a notion in the context of a consent
decree because its definition of finality is that "a judicial decision becomes the last word of the
judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211,212(1995). Some of the judges at the Benjamin Hen bane oral argument
also challenged the notion that the test for finality is the point at which the right to appeal has
expired. The plaintiffs responded that finality cannot mean different things in different contexts.
See Benjamin Audio Tape, supra note 92.
98. Judge John M. Walker, Jr., during the en bane argument of Benjamin 11, took issue
with the proper definition of "finality" in light of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and its interpretation in
Rufo v. Inmates ofSuffolkCounlyJail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992). See Benjamin Audio Tape, supra
note 92.
99. See Benjamin Audio Tape, supra note 92; see also Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86 n.38 (1982) ("Although the entry of an enforcement
order is in some respects merely formal, it has long been recognized that '[t]he award of execu-
tion ... is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial
power. It is no judgment in the legal sense of the term without it.'" (quoting ICC v. Brimson,
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Separation of powers should not turn on a seemingly arbitrary choice of
defining whether something is final, or whether public or private rights are
being implicated. Resting the doctrine of separation of powers on definitional
choices encourages courts to engage in results-oriented decisionmaking by
focusing their separation of powers analysis simply on the horizontal relation-
ship between the branches of government, rather than the equally important
vertical rights at stake. The danger of allowing federal courts to predetermine
whether to terminate the decree prior to any rigorous consideration of the
separation of powers issues implicated by the PLRA trivializes the fundamen-
tal role of protecting individual due process rights that the doctrine plays in
our constitutional system of government.'" The increasing pressure of federal
dockets" 1 and the sentiment that federal courts should extricate themselves
from prison management provide additional incentives to apply the immediate
termination provisions blindly, without giving much thought to their potential
constitutional implications. Both horizontal and vertical integrity are neces-
sary for separation of powers to work properly. Because separation of powers
is a structural doctrine fundamental to the protection of individual rights, such
oblivious application of the termination provisions is unsatisfying and unac-
ceptable.
B. Prescribing Rules of Decision in Pending Cases
Congress also violates the separation of powers doctrine by prescribing
rules of decision to Article II courts in pending cases.1" In the aftermath of
154 U.S. 447, 484 (1894))). Nonetheless, the en bane Second Circuit declared that finality
"may be defined differently for different purposes" depending on whether the judgment is one
for money damages or one for injunctive, executory relief. Benjamin H, 172 F.3d at 160. On
the basis of this distinction, which the Second Circuit drew from the Plaut decision, and the
inherent power of courts to modify or terminate prospective injunctive relief, the en bane court
found no Plaut violation. Id. at 162.
100. In disagreeing with the en bane Second Circuit majority but concurring in the result,
Judge Calabresi attempted to explain why his colleagues may have reached an incorrect decision.
Judge Calabresi frankly acknowledged that judges "have been trained to downplay the signifi-
cance of formal rules and to concern ourselves predominantly or even exclusively with results.
[Judges] tend to look at law primarily as an engine to achieve immediate goals, and to ignore
its symbolic significance. Thinking this way, it is all too easy to equate (a) the termination of
judicial judgments with (b) changes in underlying laws, when both bring about the same
results." Benjamin I, 172 F.3d 144, 190 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
101. There was a two percent increase in the total number of filings in federal district
courts from 1996 to 1997, although case terminations rose less than one percent during that
same time. See Leonidas Ralph MechamJudicialBusiness of the United States Courts: 1997,
REPORT OF THE DaREcroR 15 (1997). "Because filings outnumbered terminations, the pending
caseload grew 9 percent" Id.
102. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871) (opining that proper
duty of court is to "apply ordinary rules to new... circumstances" in such cases).
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the Civil War, Congress passed the Abandoned and Captured Property Act of
1863,03 which enabled non-combatant Confederate landowners to recover
confiscated property upon proof of loyalty to the federal government °4 The
plaintiff in United States v. Klein °5 was the administrator of V.F. Wilson, a
Confederate sympathizer, who sought to recover the proceeds of the sale of
Wilson's cotton, which had been confiscated by the United States Treasury
during the Civil War."' 6 He brought suit in the Court of Claims, presenting
evidence of a presidential pardon as proof of loyalty, in accordance with
applicable Supreme Court precedent."° The Court of Claims granted judg-
ment to the administrator, and the United States appealed.10 s While the case
was pending, Congress enacted another statute declaring that a presidential
pardon was proof of disloyalty, and directed the dismissal of any pending case
on grounds of lack ofjurisdiction.1'
Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, writing for the Court, began his analysis
by first commenting on what the statute was not:
Undoubtedly the legislature has complete control over the organization and
existence of [the Court of Claims] and may confer or withhold the right of
appeal from its decisions. And if this act did nothing more, it would be our
duty to give it effect If it simply denied the right of appeal in a particular
class of cases, there could be no doubt that it must be regarded as an exercise
of the power of Congress to make "such exceptions from the appellate juris-
diction" as should seem to it expedient."0
However, the Court surmised that the statute's "great and controlling purpose
is to deny to pardons granted by the President the effect which this court had
adjudged them to have.""1  Accordingly, the Court wrote that
the denial of jurisdiction to this court, as well as to the Court of Claims, is
founded solely onthe application ofa rule of decision, in causes pending, pre-
scri'bedby Congress. The court has jurisdiction ofthe cause to a given point;
but when it ascertains that a certain state of things exists, its jurisdiction is to
cease and it is required to dismiss the cause for want ofjurisdiction." 2
103. Abandoned and Captured PropertyAct of 1863,12 Stat 820 (1863).
104. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 131 (describingAbandoned and Captured PropertyAct of 1863).
105. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
106. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 136 (1871) (describing Aban-
doned and Captured Property Act of 1863).
107. Id. at 133-34, 142-43. The Supreme Court established the competency of such proof
in United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
108. Klein, 80 U.S. at 132.
109. See id. at 133-34,143-44; see also 16 Stat 235 (1870).
110. Klein, 80 U.S. at 145 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 146.
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The Court observed that this was "not an exercise of the acknowledged
power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the
appellate power" and thus, invalidated the statute because it "passed the limit
which separates the legislative from the judicial power.'1 3 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court carefully distinguished Wheeling as a situation in which
"the court was left to apply its ordinary rules to the new circumstances created
by the act," whereas the legislation here created no new circumstances." 4 The
Court was simply "forbidden to give the effect to evidence which, in its own
judgment, such evidence should have, and is directed to give it an effect
precisely contrary.""15
The "Klein violation" challenge to the PLRA contends analogously that
Congress has usurped an Article III court's adjudicatory function by prescrib-
ing a rule of decision, that is, immediate termination, to cases with pending
consent decrees." 6 For the most part, courts that have considered the Plaut
violation challenge to the termination provisions also have ruled on the Klein
violation, with a majority of the courts finding no separation of powers
violation on the Klein violation theory." 7 One such court has concluded that
113. Id. at 146-47.
114. Id. at 147.
115. Id.
116. Once again, the arguments made by the plaintiffs in Benjamin I and Benjamin 1U
illustrate why the PLRA may be construed as a Klein violation. See Appellants' Brief at 15-23,
Benjamin 11, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 95-7957). The plaintiffs begin by drawing an
analogy between the termination provisions and the statute at issue in Klein. They contend that
both involve the determination of the existence of certain facts: a pardon in Klein and the absence
of particular findings under the PLRA. The plaintiffs allege that Congress has impermissibly
reduced an Article III court's power to decide substantive issues of law to a simple mechanical
exercise.
The point the plaintiffs make, like the point that the plaintiff in Klein makes, concerns the
enforcement of a constitutional, and not a statutory, right - a president's constitutional power
of pardon in Klein, and the plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the PLRA. Accordingly, the
plaintiffs maintain that Congress has infringed upon a proper exercise of judicial power of
determining when a remedy in a constitutional case has been "effective" such that the constitu-
tional violation will not recur. This argument dovetails into a discussion of Wheeling and what
rights the PLRA has altered - legal rights derived from the Constitution.
117. The First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have found no Klein
violation. See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 657-58 (1st Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2366 (1998); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178, 186-
87 (3d Cir. 1999); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365,372 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1277 (1997); Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir.), cert, denied sub nom. Hadix v.
McGinnis, 118 S. Ct. 2368 (1998); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1089 (8th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2374 (1998); Nichols v. Hopper, No. 97-6818,1999 WL 238837, at *2-
3 (1 1th Cir. Apr. 23,1999). In contrast, the Ninth Circuit did find a separation of powers viola-
tion but then affirmed on other grounds after a rehearing en bane. See Taylor v. United States,
143 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (9th Cir.), reh'g en bane granted and op. withdrawn, 158 F.3d 1059
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"it is the authority of the district court to approve relief greater than that
required by the Eighth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment itself, that is
at stake.""' 8 Consequently, Congress is considered to have deprived district
courts of their authority "to award relief greater than that required by the
federal law."" 9 In so doing, Congress is considered to have amended the law
applicableto the case rather than to have dictated a rule of decision.' As the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained:
The rule of Klein does not apply here because this is not a case in which
Congress has prescribed a rule of decision and has left the court no adjudi-
catory function to perform. Congress has left the judicial functions of
interpreting the law and applying the law to the facts entirely in the hands
ofthe courts. The PLRA leaves the judging to judges, and therefore it does
not violate'the Klein doctrine.'
2'
In the Second Circuit, the original panel relied on its construction of the
statute to avoid the Klein problem altogether, although it cleverly observed
that, "if legislation can be characterized as changing the underlying law rather
than as prescribing a different outcome under the pre-existing law, it will not
violate the separation of powers principle formulated inKlein."'" On rehear-
ing en banc, the plaintiffs did not renew their Klein challenge to the immediate
termination provisions and the en banc court refrained from expressing any
opinion on the Klein challenge when it vacated the panel opinion."
In contrast to these courts, a panel of the Ninth Circuit insisted that the
statute "provides no room for judicial decision-making."'24 The court argued
that it presently was unable to make the findings required by the statute
(9th Cir. 1998), and a ffd on other grounds as moot, Nos. 97-16069 & 97-16071, 1999 WL
402748 (9th Cir. June 18, 1999).
A district court in the Seventh Circuit concurs with the majority of appellate courts. See
Green v. Peters, No. 71 C 1403, 1997 VWL 769458, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1997) (mem.),
reconsideration granted in part and denied in part on other grounds, 1998 WL 246487 (N.D.
M11. 998) (mem.). However, one district court in the Fifth Circuit does not concur. See Ruiz
v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp.2d 855, 878-79 (S.D. Tex 1999).
118. Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365,372 (4th Cir. 1996).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1089 (8th Cir. 1997) (citations and footnote omit-
ted), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 2374 (1998).
122. Benjamin I, 124 F.3d 162, 174 (2d Cir. 1997), vacated, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999)
(en bane).
123. See Benjamin I, 172 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane).
124. Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 1178,1184 (9th Cir.) (observing that PLRA defines
scope and nature of remedy but does not effect change in substantive law), reh 'gen banc granted
and op. withdrawn, 158 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1998), and affd on other grounds as moot, Nos.
97-16069 & 97-16071, 1999 WL 402748 (9th Cir. June 18, 1999).
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because no record would have been made at the time the consent decree was
entered." s This result would occur because "[o]ne of the normal purposes of
consent to the judicial decree is to avoid making a record which would lead
to such findings.' Moreover, the court observed that if the decree were
being obeyed, there would be no "current and ongoing violation," a necessary
finding in order to continue the decree.'" Finally, the court opined that if the
violations of the past decree were indeed occurring, "to continue the decree
the prisoner class would be required to prove an entirely new case, to establish
a present constitutional violation of the same magnitude as would warrant
relief had the existing case never occurred."" The court concluded that all
the prisoners could "achieve under the PLRA is what can be achieved through
any new action which proves current violations" and thus, "pre-PLRA consent
decrees effectively are extinguished."'" After a rehearing en bane, however,
the court simply affirmed on other grounds and rendered no opinion on the
Klein issue.
30
The main weakness in the plaintiffs' argument is that the analogy to
Klein is a loose fit. The core of a Klein violation is the total absence of the
adjudicatory process by the judiciary; that is, the separation of powers viola-
tion occurs because Congress has usurped the judiciary's adjudicatory func-
tion by dictating the outcome of pending cases. In the challenge to the PLRA,
despite the arguments made by the Ninth Circuit panel, the judiciary's role as
a fact-finder is preserved: The consent decree will not be terminated if the
court "makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief
remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal
right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive
means to correct the violation.0 1' Although the practical effect of these
narrow tailoring requirements may be that many pre-PLRA consent decrees
will be terminated, it is by no means a foregone conclusion in every pending
case.'32 Moreover, the plaintiffs' arguments again suffer from a definitional





130. See Taylor v. United States, Nos. 97-16069 & 97-16071, 1999 WL 402748 (9th Cir.
June 18,1999).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(bX3) (Supp. 11994).
132. However, this requirement invokes an argument that plaintiffs have not before
attempted to argue when challenging the statute: that the termination provisions impermissibly
dictate to the federal judiciary what constitutes a constitutional violation through the guise of
laying out the conditions for prospective relief
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uncertainty as to what substantive law Congress is altering. As in the Plaut
violation.challenge, the majority of courts allow the horizontal separation of
powers analysis to trump the vertical and so place less emphasis on the nature
of the rights being adjudicated.
IV Separation ofPowers and Invading Inherent Equitable Powers
This Article thus far has surveyed the arguments made by plaintiffs chal-
lenging the PLRA immediate termination provisions on the basis that they
impermissibly open final judgments and prescribe rules of decision in pending
cases. In the Plaut violation scenario, plaintiffs essentially were challenging
how the PLRA termination provisions operated to deprive them of a judgment
sought and obtained in. federal court. By questioning the prospective effects
of a federal court's settled ruling, the separation of powers problem exempli-
fied in Plaut only indirectly addresses the adjudicatory powers of a federal
court. The Klein violation scenario, by contrast, can be thought of as a more
direct challenge to the termination provisions because it is framed as depriv-
ing federal courts of their most basic function: to render decisions in the cases
before them. However, as demonstrated in Part M, both theories fail to
embrace the precise separation of powers violation committed by the PLRA
immediate termination provisions because they suffer from definitional uncer-
tainties and a weak analogy.
The third and final separation of powers challenge contends that Con-
gress has impermissibly invaded the federal courts' inherent equitable powers
in the course of its adjudications of constitutional claims. The challenge
contends that Congress has done this by placing limitations on the way in
which prospective relief may be issued and administered. This theory shifts
the focus of the inquiry closer to the heart of the federal courts' adjudicatory
function. Not explicitly based on any specific Supreme Court case, the
challenge requires a deeper understanding of the judiciary's function in
awarding equitable relief, and of how the PLRA's termination provisions
The genesis of this argument comes from City ofBoerne v. Flores, in which the Supreme
Court declared RFRA unconstitutional because, under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress only has the power to enforce the provisions of that amendment, and not to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation. City of Boeme v. Blores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-18
(1997). Although Congress arguably accomplished exactly the same thing inLaufv. E.G. Shin-
ner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938), with respect to the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. § 113(c)
(1937)), at that time there was no doubt that Congress had the power to dictate the terms under
which an injunction would be issued for rights created solely by a federal statute, a creature of
Congress's own making. Congress should not have such plenary authority with respect to the
PLRA's attempts to circumscribe rights embodied within the federal constitution. To the extent
Congress has changed the statutory or decisional law underlying prison conditions lawsuits, it
has done so by dictating what constitutes a constitutional violation in the same way RFRA did.
See Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 877-78 & n.35 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
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impermissibly encroach upon that function, thereby violating the separation
of powers doctrine. 33 Initially, this Part evaluates the court decisions that
have addressed this separation of powers challenge. This Part next demon-
strates the provisions' constitutional infinnity by presenting an analysis ofthe
text of the Constitution, its history, and its structure.
A. Current Success of the Argument
Only a handful of courts have expressly addressed this challenge and
have uniformly found no violation of the separation of powers doctrine.134 For
example, in Green v. Peters,35 the plaintiff contended that the termination
provisions unconstitutionally restrained the remedial powers of courts to
shape appropriate remedies in prison litigation cases by "[tying] the hands of
133. Once again, the plaintiffs' arguments in Benjamin I are illustrative. See Appellants'
Brief at 25-39, Benjamin I, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 96-7957); Appellants' Reh'g
Brief at 45-49, Benjamin 17 (No. 96-7967). The plaintiffs begin by arguing that underMarbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), it is a federal court's duty to determine the parame-
ters of constitutional doctrine and to fashion adequate remedies for violations of law, particu-
larly in enforcing constitutional rights. Pursuant to this duty, the plaintiffs claim that federal
courts have the inherent power to provide aggrieved plaintiffs with a remedy and that this
remedy must effectively address the constitutional violation in their particular case. Moreover,
the plaintiffs claim that once a consent decree has been entered, its oversight and duration are
governed by judicial rules that ensure its effectiveness. Under these rules, consent decrees are
to be vacated only when the defendant demonstrates full and satisfactory compliance for a
reasonable period of time, exhibits a good faith commitment to the decree and the legal prin-
ciples that warranted judicial intervention, and demonstrates that it is unlikely to return to its
former ways.
The plaintiffs further submit that while the decree is in effect the court has the power to
modify it, if the proposed modification has been suitably tailored to the changed circumstance,
and there has been a significant change in circumstances, in either fact or law. Because the
PLRA requires termination of existing decrees in the absence of these showings, the plaintiffs
contend that the PLRA conflicts with a court's duty to ensure that constitutional remedies are
effective, thereby violating the separation of powers doctrine.
The plaintiffs conclude by arguing that the PLRA replaces a large body of Supreme Court
precedents concerning the entry, modification, and termination of consent decrees with an
ineffective remedial regime and that the caselaw upholding limitations on federal court remedial
powers does not support the PLRA. In sum, the plaintiffs argue that a court's power to deter-
mine when equitable relief is no longer necessary is integral to the Article III judicial power.
134. See Benjamin I, 172 F.3d 144, 162 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane); Imprisoned Citizens
Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178, 188 (3d Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Hopper, No. 97-6818, 1999 WL
238837, at *4 (1 1th Cir. Apr. 23, 1999); Tyler v. Murphy, 135 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 1998);
Green v. Peters, No. 71 C 1403, 1997 WL 769458, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1997) (mem.),
reconsideration granted in part and denied in part on other grounds, 1998 WL 246487 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 27, 1998) (mem.); Thompson v. Gomez, 993 F. Supp. 749,763-64 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
135. No. 71 C 1403, 1997 WL 769458, at *8-9 (N.D. II. Dec. 5,1997) (mem.), reconsid-
eration granted in part and denied in part on other grounds, 1998 WL 246487 (N.D. M11. Apr.
27, 1998) (mem.).
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federal judges such that they will be unable to deal effectively with unconsti-
tutional practices in our prisons.""13 While conceding that "[tjhe PLRA may
take away some of a court['s] discretionary power," the court concluded
that "it still guarantees that a court may provide narrowly-tailored prospec-
tive relief upon a finding of an ongoing constitutional violation."'3 7 Moreover,
the court found that the termination provisions "simply allow[ ] litigants a
more direct way to facilitate such requests" and "[t]hough a close call...
§ 3626(b)(2) provides for the vacatur of judgments in compliance with the
applicable constitutional safeguards."'38 Indeed, the Green court found that
the PLRA's supposed "flexibility" in permitting a court to impose revised
relief "saves § 3626(b)(2) from more serious constitutional concerns." '139
Despite its different interpretation of the immediate termination provi-
sions, the Second Circuit panel generally agreed with the other courts:
It is of course true that section 3626(b) diminishes the power ofthe federal
courts. That diminution, however, does not infringe upon the power that
courts must retain in order to meet their obligation of forging adequate
remedies .... While the Act takes away that discretionary power [to afford
reliefthrough consent decrees over and above what they could award after
a litigated judgment concerning federal rights], it guarantees thatthe court
may continue to give prospective relief ifit finds on the record that federal
constitutionalviolations exist andthatthe relief is appropriatelytailored to
remedy theviolation. The courts will thus stillbe able to remedyviolations




The diminution in a federal court's inherent powers was the subject of
much colloquy during the Benjamin Hen banc argument. Judge Fred I. Parker,
136. Green v. Peters, No. 71 C 1403, 1997 WL 769458, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1997)
(mem.),reconsiderafion granted in part and denied in part on other grounds, 1998 WL246487
(N.D. II1. Apr. 27, 1998) (mem.).
137. Id; see also Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178, 187 (3d Cir. 1999)
("Under the PLRA, courts retain their authority to adjudicate constitutional challenges and grant
equitable relief to remedy constitutional violations."); Thompson v. Gomez, 993 F. Supp. 749,
763-64 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that Rufo "does not define a constitutional limit on Congress'
power" and that the PLRA "does prevent courts from providing more relief than the minimum
necessary to correct federal violations" by reducing "permissible relief to the constitutional
'floor').
138. Green, 1997 WL 769458, at *9.
139. Id; see also Tyler v. Murphy, 135 F.3d 594,597 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Section 3626(bX3)
expressly permits the district court to continue appropriately tailored prospective relief that the
court finds necessary to remedy a current violation of federal rights. Thus, the statute preserves
a court's ability to remedy constitutional violations." (citing Green, 1997 WL 769458, at *8)).
140. Benjamin I, 124 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 1997), vacated, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999)
(en bane).
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during the appellee's argument, expressly questioned whether the diminution
in power ofthe federal courtto enter relief was a separation ofpowers problem:
J. Parker: [A]s I understand it, one of the things thatthe parties cannot do
is what they can do in every other constitutional litigation,
which is to enter into a consent decree, to be approved by the
court, which renders relief beyond whatever the constitutional
rights may be. Now that seems to me to be an alteration ofthe
power that the courts have in all other cases, and traditionally
had in their adjudicative function. So that gets back to the
separation of powers question.
Appellee: But I think it's an unexceptional diminution in power. All it
really is, isjustthat courts can't enter relief which goes beyond,
which is extra-constitutional relief. I don't think that that
touches the constitutional right. By definition, that doesn't
touch the constitutional right Courts can still enter any relief
that's needed.
J. Parker: It doesn't touch the constitutional right, but I'm talking about
the power of the court being regulated by the Legislature. And
that would be my concern. It seems to me that the power of
court is being regulated.
Appellee: Yes.... Yes.'
4'
141. Benjamin Audio Tape, supra note 92. The following exchange between Judge Cala-
bresi, Judge Parker, and the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) also demonstrates the
court's concern over this issue:
J. Calabresi: Does Congress have the power, whether it exercised it or not, to
make void a contract which is in exchange for constitutional
rights?
USAO: I think the answer to that must be yes. But, if I could, simply
reiterate that what Congress has done here is to change the appli-
cable remedial standards. It has the power under Article I to
change the court's regulatory powers.
J. Calabresi: Let me be clear. You say Congress has the power, but you say
that we should read this statute as saying that they did not exercise
that power. Or, at least, that we should leave it to state courts to
decide that question as well.
USAO: Yes, your Honor.... What Congress did with respect to the
PLRA was simply to invoke the powers that it possesses to set the
standards for the imposition of prospective ongoing relief. Once
Congress amends that applicable law, the courts have the obliga-
tion, the responsibility under the applicable law, in deciding
whether or not it is appropriate to continue injunctive relief...
This Act does not strip the courts of their power, their inherent
authority to remedy constitutional violations ....
J. Parker. What about their basic inherent authority to approve settlements?
It deprives the courts in these kind of cases from doing so unless
they make a different set of findings than required under prior
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Ultimately, though, a majority of the en bane Second Circuit agreed with the
original panel and concluded that the immediate termination provisions did
not interfere with the courts' power and duty to remedy constitutional viola-
tions:
In the PLRA, Congress has neither defined nor altered the federal rights that
may be vindicated in prisoner litigation. Nor has it forbidden the court, if it
finds a violation of federal right, to order or enforce such relief as the court
finds is needed to remedy the violation of that right The Act's termination
provision simply forbids the continuation of prospective relief that exceeds
what is needed to remedy a continuing violation of the federal right 42
Although concurring in the result, Judge Calabresi (joined by Judges
Leval and Jacobs), 43 wrote vigoronsly in oppositionto the majority's interpre-
tation of the immediate termination provisions as directing federal courts to
alter, modify, or terminate the decrees themselves: "[Under that interpreta-
tion, the PLRA] attempts to do exactly what has never been permitted. For
then it grants the legislative and the executive branches naked power over the
courts and their holdings. Such a grant impermissibly crosses the fence and
trespasses on thejudicial terrain."'44 Characterizing this interpretation as "up-
holding [an] unprecedented infringement" based only on dictum in Plaut,
14
Judge Calabresi opined that there was no difference, for separation of powers
purposes, between a judgment of the Judiciary "that has prospective effect or
one that does not. In both instances, the other branches directly invade judi-
cial territory."146 Consequently, he believed that, "under the majority's ruling,
the legislature is, for the first time in our history, permitted directly to order
courts to modify their final judgments.' 1 47 Judge Calabresi concluded that,
because "everything that Congress sought to achieve by this part of the PLRA
is as well accomplished by terminating the ftture effects of the decrees as by
destroying the judgments themselves, it is ill-advised to suppose that Con-
gress, by its ambiguous language, meant to do something that raises such
law... Why wouldn't I conclude that what the Congress did is
order the court to vacate an approved settlement agreement that it
had the power to approve in the first place?
Id.
142. Benjamin II, 172 F.3d 144, 163 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane).
143. Curiously, Judge Dennis G. Jacobs joined both the majority opinion and Judge Cala-
bresi's concurrence. The three concurring opinions and the length of time between the argu-
ment (February 25, 1998) and the decision (March 23, 1999) possibly evince the Second Cir-
cuit's difficulty in resolving these issues.
144. Benjamin 1, 172 F.3d, at 177 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
145. Id. (Calabresi, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 178. (Calabresi, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 174. (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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severe Separation of Powers problems."'48 The import of these statements
appears to be that, absent his construction of the immediate termination pro-
visions, Judge Calabresi most likely would have agreed with the plaintiffs'
position on the Plaut violation issue.
Nonetheless, as the colloquy during the en banc argument suggests, there
is great confusion concerning the effect of the PLRA immediate termination
provisions. Congress may have overstepped its prerogative and meddled in
the province of judicial decisionmaking by instructing lower federal courts to
terminate prospective relief. Or, perhaps Congress avoided that indiscretion
by adding the narrow tailoring requirement,'49 which appears to be a codifica-
tion of Supreme Court precedents in the field of equity jurisdiction.5 ' Or,
assuming Judge Calabresi is correct, this concern may be merely academic
because Congress properly has exercised its plenary power to deprive inferior
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over certain types of cases.'
The arguments in support of this theory of legislative encroachment are
formidable and, unlike the other.two challenges, focus on the core adjudica-
tory functions of an Article 11 court. Instead of relying on definitional uncer-
tainties or weak analogies, this challenge goes to the most fundamental of a
federal court's functions: the ability to exercise decisionmaking jurisdiction
and to remedy constitutional violations pursuant to the authority granted to it
bythe Constitution. As Judge Walker explained it at the very beginning ofthe
appellant's argument in Benjamin :
From a constitutional perspective, isn't the separation of powers implicated
by the actions ofthe Congress in passing legislationthat may encroach onthe
court's ability to effectuate relief, and isn't it really the remedial aspects of
the court's role that becomes at issue in the separation of powers question?
I mean, here you've got the decision to limit the power of the district
courts to provide prospective reliefbeyond that which neither federal law nor
the constitutionrequires. And whyisn'tthatjust what matters ina separation
of powers context?'11
What is missing fromthe arguments is support fromthetext, history, and struc-
ture of the Constitution. A closer examination of the federal courts and their
structure will reveal that the separation of powers violation created by the
148. Id. at 181 (Calabresi, J., concurring); see also id. at 181-84 (Calabresi, ., concurring)
(explaining why congressional intent behind PLRA can be effectuated without unconstitution-
ally infringing on court judgments).
149. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3) (Supp. 111 1994) ("[P]rospective relief shall not terminate
if... the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the viola-
tion.").
150. See infra Part IV.D (discussing precedents in equity jurisdiction).
151. See infra Part IV.B (explaining textual basis for jurisdictional bounds).
152. Benjamin Audio Tape, supra note 92.
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PLRA immediate termination provisions is, indeed, one in which Congress has
impermissibly encroached on an Article HI court's inherent equitable powers.
B. Support from the Constitutional Text
Article m ofthe United States Constitution establishes a limited national
judiciary. Federal judicial power is expressly vested only in the United States
Supreme Court "and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and estabish" '153 and only extends to certain enumerated types
of cases. The federal judicial power extends "to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority."'1 4 Pursuant to these
external restraints, Article I authorizes Congress "[tlo constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court'"" and "[t]o make all Laws which shall be nec-
essary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."'5 6 Indeed, "Article HI left
Congress free to establish inferior federal courts or not as it thought appropri-
ate. It could have declined to create any such courts, leaving suitors to the
remedies afforded by state courts, with such appellate review by [the Supreme
Court] as Congress might prescribe."'57 These enabling provisions have also
long been interpreted as giving Congress the plenary power to dictate the
scope of an Article HI court's subject matter jurisdiction.'
The PLRA restricts both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts 15 9 and the judiciary's ability to afford remedial relief in cases over
153. U.S. CONST. art.Ill,§ 1.
154. Id. art.lD, § 2, cl. 1.
155. Id. art. , § 8, cl. 9.
156. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
157. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182,187 (1943).
158. SeegenerayHART&WECHSIWR'STHEFEDERALCOURTS ANDTHEEFEDERALSYSTEM
28-33 (Richard H. Fallon et al. eds., 4th ed. 1996). When Congress first created lower federal
courts under the Judiciary Act of 1789, it did not provide them with a grant of judicial power
over cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. See id. at 29. This only
changed under the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1875 (better known as the Evarts Act),
which conferred on the federal judiciary a general jurisdiction over all civil cases arising under
federal law, subject only to an amount-in-controversy requirement. See id. at 35-36. With this
enactment, "the lower federal ourts ... 'became the primary and powerful reliances for vin-
dicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States."'
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,464 (1974) (quoting FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSI-
NESs oFTHE SUPREMECoURT 65 (1928)), mandate conformed to Becker v. Thompson, 494 F.2d
691 (5th Cir. 1974).
159. See, e.g., PLRA § 803(d) (1996) (revoking federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction
over civil actions for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody if there is no showing
of prior physical injury).
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which they may exercise (or have exercised) subject matter jurisdiction. 6 °
The immediate termination provisions are unequivocally of the latter category.
They mandate what constitutes prospective relief,' entitle a party to auto-
matic termination of that relief,62 and provide only narrow limitations pre-
venting that relief from terminating. 63 Moreover, the legislative history lead-
ing to the passage of the immediate termination provisions consistently
demonstrates that Congress understood these provisions as rendering consent
decrees inoperative." That is, Congress intended to limit judicial relief and
not to remove a class of cases from the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Assuming that the immediate termination provisions limit judicial relief,
the internal restraints of Article I do not provide any clear guidance. On the
one hand, the text does not affirmatively give Congress the authority to limit
the lower federal courts' equity jurisdiction or their equitable powers. Thus,
Congress arguably does not possess the enabling power to enact legislation
such as the PLRA immediate termination provisions. Although the Supreme
Court, in a case involving the withdrawal of equity jurisdiction in cases
arising under a federal statute, held that "[t]here is nothing in the Constitution
which requires Congress to confer equity jurisdiction on any particular
inferior federal court,"'165 the Court has not yet expressed an opinion about
whether equity jurisdiction similarly could be withdrawn or limited when the
adjudication of a constitutional right is at stake."
160. See, e.g., id. § 802(a) (barring federal courts from entering prisoner release orders
unless court has previously entered order for less intrusive relief and only if three-judge court
has entered that order).
161. See id. § 802(aX1XA) ("The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief
unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to
correct the violation of the rights, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right").
162. See id. § 802(bX2) (allowing termination automatically "if the relief was approved or
granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no
further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive
means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right").
163. See id. § 802(bX3) (disallowing termination "if the court makes written findings based
on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation
of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct
the violation") (as amended).
164. See supra notes 37-62 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of im-
mediate termination provisions of PLRA).
165. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (upholding Congress's vesting
jurisdiction in Emergency Court of Appeals to restrain enforcement of price orders under
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and Supreme Court to review judgments and orders of
Emergency Court and upholding Congress's concurrent withdrawal of equity jurisdiction from
every other federal and state court).
166. This distinction between federal statutory and federal constitutional rights will be
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On the other hand, Congress retains the plenary authority to "constitute"
the lower federal courts. Consequently, if Congress decided that the immedi-
ate termination provisions were "necessary and proper" for executing a
healthy national judiciary, it may have the authority, perhaps even the plenary
authority, to limit a federal court's equitable powers. 6
The external restraints imposed by Article III are also ambiguous. The
text suggests that federal judicial power with respect to cases arising under the
Constitution, federal laws, or treaties must be vested "in Law and Equity"
together. Nothing in the text discusses limitations on the federal courts'
equity jurisdiction or equitable powers. Thus, when Congress chooses to
establish inferior federal courts, it arguably may not divest equity jurisdiction
from law jurisdiction, or place limitations on either law or equity jurisdiction.
That is, Article Im gives Congress the greater power to create lower federal
courts. This power logically subsumes the lesser power to eliminate them in
toto, but not the power to place limitations on their equity jurisdiction or
equitable powers. Therefore, by placing restrictions on the federal courts'
ability to afford equitable relief, the PLRA immediate termination provisions
potentially run afoul of the constitutional text.
However, because the text is silent on the placement of any limitations
on the courts' equity jurisdiction or equitable powers, an alternative interpre-
tation is possible. Because the immediate termination provisions do not
abolish equity jurisdiction completely, but only limit the federal courts' power
to afford equitable relief, the law and equity jurisdictions remain vested in the
federal courts. Thus, the immediate termination provisions may not implicate
the text of Article III at all.'
discussed in greater detail later. See infra Part IV.C (discussing distinction between cases that
arise under Constitution and those that implicate federal laws and treaties).
167. In making this argument, I reject the interpretation of the "necessary and proper"
language as limiting legislation to only those statutes that are indispensable to achieving the
ends envisioned by Congress. This restrictive reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause was
rejected by the Supreme Court long ago. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316
(1819).
168. However, a textual ambiguity arises if equity jurisdiction is limited by legislation to
a point that is equivalent to a complete elimination of equitable powers. This elimination of
equitable powers is akin to the dilemma presented by regulatory takings challenges under the
Takings Clause jurisprudence. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922)
("The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation"). Since Mahon, however,
the Supreme Court has made notable strides toward providing somewhat helpful guideposts and
rules. See generally Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980); KaiserAetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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The Second Circuit panel's creative, saving construction - interpreting
the immediate termination provisions as merely depriving federal courts of
subject matter jurisdiction over prison consent decrees - is also a plausible
interpretation of the terms of the statute.1 69 However, neither the constitu-
tional text, nor the PLRA's language or legislative history 70 supports constru-
ing the immediate termination provisions in this manner.1' The only benefit
of adopting the Second Circuit panel's construction is to avoid the serious
constitutional implications lurking underneath.'72
Accordingly, at this point of the analysis, the constitutional text neither
supports nor proscribes the power of Congress to place limitations on the
federal courts' equity jurisdiction or equitable powers when they are adjudi-
cating a constitutional right. Because the separation of powers doctrine is a
structural hallmark of the Constitution (and thus, not expressly articulated
therein), textual restraints on the enactment of statutes such as the PLRA
termination provisions would not be expected. To find such restraints, one
must search beyond the text for relevant historical and structural arguments
that may better inform the analysis.
C. Lessons from History
The Federalist Papers provide a starting point for conducting a historical
analysis. Exploration of The Federalist Papers leads to a consideration of the
courts' equity jurisdiction, which the Framers developed from English roots.
The nature of this equity jurisdiction demonstrates that the federal courts
possess inherent equitable powers that resist congressional regulation. Consti-
tutional history suggests that the PLRA immediate termination provisions
impermissibly invade the federal courts' inherent equitable powers in violation
of the separation of powers doctrine.
The Framers wanted to ensure that none of the three branches "possess
directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the adminis-
tration of their respective powers." '173 The Framers also were wary of the
powers of the legislature and foretold that the legislature "can with greater
facility, mask under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments
169. See supra notes 140-52 and accompanying text (describing and analyzing Second
Circuit panel's construction).
170. See supra Part II (discussing PLRA's language and legislative history).
171. But see Benjamin II, 172 F.3d 144, 171-84 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring) (concluding that PLRA's language and legislative history support such reading of
statute).
172. See id. at 174-78 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (identifying separation of powers problem
in majority's interpretation of PLRA immediate termination provisions).
173. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 250 (James Madison) (Garry Will ed., 1982).
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which it makes on the co-ordinate departments."'74 Within this overall argu-
ment for the separation of powers doctrine as an indispensable structural hall-
mark of the new federal government, the Framers included passages suggest-
ing that Congress violates the Constitution when it enacts legislation that
places limitations on an Article ll court's equitable powers.
Specifically, the Framers described the judiciary's use of rules of con-
struction in its exercise of discretion in the following manner: "It is a rule not
enjoined upon the courts by legislative provision, but adopted by themselves,
as consonant to truth and propriety, for the direction of their conduct as inter-
preters of law.""' The Framers envisioned a fhirly strict wall of separation
between the branches that would render the discretion accorded to the federal
courts impervious to assault by the legislature. Indeed, the practice of subject-
ing the judiciary's rulings to revisions by the legislature was practiced neither
in Great Britain nor in the various state legislatures in existence at the time of
the Constitution's ratification'76 and was not contemplated in the new govern-
ment.17 7 Consequently, the Framers understood that "[a] legislature without
exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once made, in a particu-
lar case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases."' 8 This limita-
tion exists because the legislature "prescribes the rules by which the duties
and rights of every citizen are to be regulated," but the judiciary is empowered
to interpret the laws - a function that "is the proper and peculiar province of
the couts."179
Thus, the Framers intended that the judiciary's core adjudicative function
be free from legislative alteration. Decisionmaking, an essential element of
174. Id. at 251; accord Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) ("The Framers regarded
the checks and balances that they had built into the tripartite Federal Government as a self-
executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense
of the other.").
175. TBE FEDB ISTNO. 78, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gany Willed., 1982).
176. See id. No. 81, at 411 (Alexander Hamilton) ("It is not true ... that the parliament of
Great Britain, or the legislatures of the particular states, can rectify the exceptionable decisions
of their respective courts, in any other sense than might be done by a future legislature of the
United States. The theory neither of the British, nor the state constitutions, authorises the
revisal of ajudicial sentence, by a legislative act.").
177. See id. at 410 ("And there is a still greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men
selected for their knowledge ofthe laws, acquired by long and laborious study, to the revision and
control of men, who for want ofthe same advantage cannot but be deficient in that knowledge.").
178. Id.; accord Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,218-26 (1995) (providing
extensive history of understanding that Legislature is not to revise Judiciary's rulings); Chicago
& S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,113 (1948) ("Judgments, within the
powers vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution, may not lawfully be revised,
overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government.").
179. THE FEDEALIST No. 78, at 393,395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Will ed., 1982).
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the judiciary's adjudicatory powers, was to be left within the province of
Article mII courts. The historical nature ofthe equity jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts, adopted from England, then becomes relevant to the analysis.
The English judicial system heavily influenced the American system.
For example, American jurisprudence borrows from that which existed in
Great Britain.18° In discussing the right to a jury trial, the Framers believed
that "the separation of the equity from the legal jurisdiction is peculiar to the
English system of jurisprudence; which is the model that has been followed
in several of the states."'' The Framers thought that "great advantages result
from the separation of the equity from the law jurisdiction. 1 82 However, in
crafting Article I, the Framers chose to join the two jurisdictions in one resi-
dent tribunal, rather than adopt the separation of law and equity that existed
in England at the time.183 Irrespective of this joinder, American concepts of
equity jurisprudence stem from English roots.8 4 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has consistently reaffirmed the understanding that:
[o]riginaljurisdiction in equity, in aparticular class of cases, conferredby
the constitution on this court, has been interpreted to impose the duty to
adjudicate according to such rules and principles as governed the action of
the court of chancery in England, which administered equity at the time of
the emigration of our ancestors, and down to the period when our constitu-
tion was formed. And whenthe constitution ofthe United States conferred
that jurisdiction on this court, it cannot be construed to exclude the power
possessed and constantly exercised by every court of equity then known,
to use its discretion to award or refuse costs, as its judgment of the right of
the case, in that particular, might require."
Equity courts arose in England during the fourteenth century, although
the Court of Chancery itself did not appear until the fifteenth century, when
the volume of petitions necessitated a separate court. 86 Equity courts were
designed to provide remedies in those situations in which the award of mone-
180. See, e.g., id. No. 83, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) ("In this state ourjudicial establish-
ments resemble more nearly, than in any other, those of Great-Britain. We have courts of
common law, courts of probates (analogous in certain matters to the spiritual courts in England)
a court of admiralty, and a court of chancery.").
181. Id. at430.
182. Id. at 429.
183. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICiALPROCESS 16 (2d ed. 1968).
184. See Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 n26 (1949) ("Notwith-
standing the fusion of law and equity by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the substantive principles
of Courts of Chancery remain unaffected.").
185. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 462
(1855).
186. See ABRAHAM, supra note 183, at 16.
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tary damages by a law court failed to remedy the harm.'" These remedies
took the form of decrees rather than judgments. 8
The courts did not consider themselves to be "administer[ing] any body
of substantive rules that differed from the ordinary law of the land." '189 They
were "administering the law but they were administering it in cases which
escaped the meshes of the ordinary courts."'' For example, a plaintiff might
claim to be entitled to a remedy, but because of some other factor such as
poverty, age, health, relative wealth, or fraud, the plaintiff is unable to utilize
the procedures found in the ordinary law courts to procure the relief.191 Of
course, the courts were not permitted to overstep their bounds by becoming
adjudicators of the substantive laws the plaintiff's complaint implicated."9
That kind of adjudication was within the province of the law courts.
Although the sources ofthe chancery process are still imperfectly known,
there was undoubtedly some connection to the common law. 93 During the
course ofthe sixteenth century, "rules of equity and good conscience" '194 devel-
oped, allowing the Chancellor to rule according to the dictates of his con-
science. 95 The adjudicatory process was fluid and informal, based entirely
on individual discretion and not on any theory ofjudicial precedent. That is,
the court decided cases without much reference to written authority. The
court resorted to analogies from the common law or generally accepted
maxims of jurisprudence when appropriate.'96
Over time, the power of the Chancery Court gradually increased. Al-
though it never asserted superiority over courts of law, it could, for example,
hold that a judgment was wrongly granted, thereby finding that it would be
inequitable for a party to enforce it.' Because the judgment itself was not
annulled, the Chancery Court essentially prevented parties from further relief
in the courts of law; however, law courts were not empowered to do the same
to the Chancery Court.198
187. See id.; H. G. HANBURY, ENGLisH COURTS OF LAW 138 (1960).
188. See ABRAHAM, supra note 183, at 17; HAINBURY, supra note 187, at 128.
189. F. W. MArmAND, EQurry: A CoURsE oF LECruREs 5 (1936).
190. Id.
191. See id. at 4-6.
192. See id. at 6.
193. See LORD NOTINGHAM'S 'MANUAL OF CHANCERYPRACicE' AND 'PROLEGOMENA
oF CHANCERY AND EQUITy' 23 (D. E. C. Yale ed. 1965).
194. MArrLADsupra note 189, at 8.
195. See HANBURY, supra note 187, at 128; MArLAND, supra note 189, at 8.
196. SeeABRAHAM, supra note 183, at 17; HANBURY, supra note 187, at 129; NAIAD,
supra note 189, at 8-9; NOTINGHAM, supra note 193, at 16.
197. See MUrLAN, supra note 189, at 9.
198. See id. at 10.
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Equity also acted in personam.'1 The predominate characteristic of
equity procedure was the personal constraint of the defendant.2" In acting
against the defendant inpersonam, equity demanded that the defendant appear
before the court pursuant to the plaintiff's complaint so that the defendant's
conscience could be examined bythe Chancellor.20' Once in court, the defend-
ant would be examined under oath and was subject to the direction of the
court.2" The inquiry focused on the defendant because the court was con-
cerned with the defendant's conscience rather than the plaintiff's rights.03
If the court were satisfied that damages would be an inadequate remedy,
it would issue a decree forbidding the defendant from commencing or continu-
ing the complained-of conduct .2  For example, in the area of contracts, it
might decree specific performance, cancel the contract, or even reconcile con-
flicting written documents."5 However, "[w]hat equity gave only equity could
take away. 1206 Thus, for example, if a mortgagee, once having obtained the
relief of equity of redemption before the Chancery Court, wished to rid itself
of that remedy, it could do so only by obtaining another remedy from the
Chancery Court, the decree of foreclosure.0 7
Beginning in 1672, equity gradually became a system of precedents,
resembling more and more the functioning of the courts of law and conse-
quently, the common law.2"s Moreover, the legislature began codifying
certain aspects ofthe equity jurisdiction. For example, the power to order the
specific restitution of chattel was given to the common law action of detinue
in 1854.2" Also in 1854, the legislature granted injunctive and specific per-
formance powers to common law courts, and in 1858, the legislature gave the
Chancery Court the ability to order the payment of damages, thereby presag-
ing the eventual joinder of equity and law in 1875."2l
At least four general principles can be ascertained from the preceding dis-
cussion of equityjurisdiction in England. First, equityjurisdiction was rooted
199. See NOTnNGHAM, supra note 193, at 17.
200. See id. at 19.
201. See id. at 22; MA1TLAND, supra note 189, at 5.
202. See MArrAND, supra note 189, at 5; NOTrINGHAM, supra note 193, at 23.
203. See NOTTINGHAM, supra note 193, at 22-23.
204. See ABRAmAM, supra note 183, at 17; HANBURY, supra note 187, at 138.
205. See HANBURY, supra note 187, at 138.
206. Id. at 139.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 137.
209. See id. at 138. Detinue was a common law action for the wrongful detention of
personal property.
210. See id. at 142; MArLAND, supra note 189, at 15.
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essentially in the decisionmaker's discretion. This discretion was not unbri-
dled; rather, it was circumscribed by its focus on fashioning a fair remedy to
the situation presented by the facts. Equity jurisdiction often used analogies
from the common law or applied generally accepted maxims ofjurisprudence.
Second, equity courts acted inthose situations in which courts of law could not
provide relief, but equity courts were in no way superior to either the law
courts or the law. Third, only the entrance of another, counterbalanced remedy
by the original issuing court alleviated equitable relief, once decreed. Last,
equitable remedies could be codified by the legislature to enshrine in statutory
form the powers exercised through equity jurisdiction. These principles sug-
gest that equitable powers were considered bythe English to be inherent to the
very conception of equity courts. The power to afford equitable relief and the
form of equitable relief were fundamental to equity jurisdiction, and both were
aspects of the power of the equity court. These powers, broad in scope and
effect, were intended to be flexible so that equity courts could fashion appro-
priate remedies.
By adopting the English judicial system, the Framers incorporated these
same principles into the federal courts' equity jurisdiction."' Although all
federal courts except the Supreme Court are created by acts of Congress, the
federal courts' equity jurisdiction is an inherent component of their structure
and should remain impervious to legislative regulation once created. Accord-
ingly, under the general equitable principles discussed above, although
Congress may codify the traditional equitable remedies offered by a federal
court in its exercise of equity jurisdiction, it may neither expand nor limit
those powers.
But the foregoing argument, taken to its logical end, would mean that
Congress may not alter the equitable powers of a federal court for any and all
cases arising under the first category of federal judicial power, namely, the
Constitution, federal laws, and treaties. Surely it would be counterintuitive
to have a system of government in which Congress cannot dictate the terms
211. See, e.g., TBE FEDERAU.ST No. 83, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Will ed.,
1982) ("In this state our judicial establishments resemble more nearly, than in any other, those
of Great-Britain. We have courts of common law, courts of probates (analogous in certain
matters to the spiritual courts in England) a court of admiralty, and a court of chancery."). See
also Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, SA. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 1961, 1972
(1999) (stating that First Congress borrowed from English Court of Chancery "in conferring
equitable powers on the federal courts"); id. at 1976 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("From the
beginning, we have defined the scope of federal equity in relation to the principles of equity
existing at the separation of this country from England."); Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. WI. Southern,
Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939) (holding that jurisdiction conferred on federal courts by
Judiciary Act of 1789 over all suits in equity "is an authority to administer in equity suits the
principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being adminis-
tered by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries").
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and conditions of rights and benefits it has. itself created - and the Supreme
Court has held so."' This Article argues that a separation of powers violation
occurs only when a federal court is adjudicating rights derived from the Con-
stitution.
There is a marked distinction between cases that arise under the Constitu-
tion and those that implicate federal laws and treaties. When Congress legis-
lates to limit the remedial powers of an Article Hm court in cases arising under
a federal law or treaty, it is either creating the federal right or benefit for the
first time or amending a previously enacted federal right or benefit. If a
statute creates a federal right or benefit for the first time and simultaneously
limits the courts' equitable powers, there would be no impediment to Con-
gress's legislating in that manner, so long as the other internal and external
restraints of the Constitution are met:
[When Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has discretion, in
defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proot or
prescribe remedies; it may also provide that persons seeking to vindicate
that right must do so before particularized tribunals created to performthe
specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right Such provisions do, in
a sense, affect the exercise of judicial power, but they are also incidental
to Congress' power to define the right that it has created." 3
Alternatively, if the statute limits the power of a federal court to afford
equitable relief pertaining to a previously enacted federal right or benefit, the
amended statute can be construed as having been the one Congress intended
to enact in the first place. With respect to statutes that limit the courts' equity
jurisdiction in cases arising under federal statutes, the Supreme Court has
stated:
[Tihe comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied
or limited in the absence ofa clear and valid legislative command. Unless
a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference,
restricts the court'sjurisdictionin equity, the full scope ofthat jurisdiction
is to be recognized and applied.2"4
212. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 80 (1982)
("[lt is clear that when Congress creates a substantive federal right, it possess substantial
discretion to prescribe the manner in which that right may be adjudicated.").
213. Id. at 83 (footnote omitted).
214. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (reviewing enforcement
proceeding brought pursuant to Emergency Price Control Act); see also Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 576 n.9 (1984) ("[A] district court cannot enter a
disputed modification of a consent decree in Title VII litigation if the resulting order is inconsis-
tent with that statute. Thus, Title VII necessarily acted as a limit on the District Court's
authority to modify the decree over the objections of the City; the issue cannot be resolved
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Thus, in essence, no encroachment has occurred because Congress could
always have enacted the amended version of the federal right or benefit when
the statute was originally enacted. And by making it clear that the courts'
equity jurisdiction is being restricted in cases arising under a federal statute,
Congress is exercising its constitutional prerogative to place limitations on the
scope of federal rights it has created.
By contrast, cases arising under the Constitution necessarily must be
different because the document itself, not Congress, has created the federal
right or benefit. Moreover, the document that creates the right is also the
origin of the federal courts' existence. The Supreme Court has observed
that "[i]n such a situation, substantial inroads into functions that have tradi-
tionally been performed by the Judiciary cannot be characterized merely as
incidental extensions of Congress's power to define rights that it has created.
Rather, such inroads suggest unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial
power." '215 Accordingly, Congress is powerless to alter the scope of those
rights and benefits, unless it does so through a duly enacted constitutional
amendment.
The PLRA immediate termination provisions violate the separation of
powers doctrine because prison conditions lawsuits seek equitable relief pur-
suant to rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In enacting these provisions,
Congress has prescribed substantive and procedural rules that govern how
federal courts treat their issuance of prospective relief when a constitutional
right is at stake. This type of rulemaking impermissibly invades the courts'
inherent equitable powers.
Moreover, Congress's action has an overruling influence over the admin-
istration of justice in the federal courts. Regardless of whether Congress
adopts the Second Circuit's interpretation that the immediate termination pro-
visions are regulating the scope of the federal courts' subject matter jurisdic-
tion, Congress is accomplishing indirectly what it may not accomplish di-
rectly. If Congress cannot directly control the Judiciary by requiring the courts
to render decisions according to its own views, it should not be able to do so
indirectly by regulating their equitable powers. While Congress may enact
legislation to terminate consent decrees issued by federal courts for the
remedying of statutory violations, it may not do so for those rendered to
remedy constitutional violations without impermissibly invading the courts'
inherent equitable powers.
solely by reference to the terms of the decree and notions of equity."); System Federation No.
91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961) ("[T]he District Court's authority to adopt a consent
decree comes only from the statute which the decree is intended to enforce.").
215. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 83-84.
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D. Acknowledging a Significant Structural Impediment
Despite the foregoing historical analysis, the fact remains that the Su-
preme Court has affrmed the power of Congress to regulate the equity juris-
diction of Article I courts to some degree. Congress expressly authorized the
equity jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts in 1792 when it "provided that
the modes of proceeding in equity suits shall be according to the principles,
rules and usages which belong to courts of equity, as contradistinguished from
courts of law."2 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court also made clear that its
understanding of equity jurisdiction was that it was "subject, of course, to the
provisions of the acts of congress, and to such alterations and rules as in the
exercise of the powers delegated by those acts, the courts ofthe United States
may, from time to time, prescribe.12 17 The Supreme Court consistently recog-
nized this concurrent power to regulate the equity jurisdiction of the federal
courts throughout the nineteenth century.218
However, in the 210 years since the ratification of the Constitution, the
balance of power between the two branches has shifted in such a way that Con-
gress may no longer exercise this power to regulate a federal court's equity
jurisdiction. The structure of the American constitutional government has
changed. Equitable remedies for violations of constitutional rights have taken
on a different meaning altogether. One formidable structural obstacle that
indicates that this has happened is the line of cases beginning with the Supreme
Court's landmark opinion in Brown v. Board ofEducation. (Brown /).219 After
the institutionalization ofthis body ofprecedent, Congress may not summarily
act to expand or limit a federal court's equityjurisdiction in cases arising under
the Constitution, except through a constitutional amendment.
In what is now a familiar story, ChiefJustice Warren, writing for a unani-
mous Court, delivered the opinion that found "separate but equal" offensive to
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." This singular
decision made the federal judiciary's use of its inherent equitable powers to
provide appropriate relief to remedy constitutional violations explicitly consti-
216. Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet) 648,658 (1832).
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., Noonan v. Lee, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 499, 509 (1862) ("The equity jurisdiction
of the Courts of the United States is derived from the Constitution and Laws of the United
States. Their powers and rules of decision are the same in all the States. Their practice is regu-
lated by themselves, and by rules established by the Supreme Court. This Court is invested by
law with authority to make such rules."), overruled in part by Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S.
648 (1873).
219. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
220. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954) (finding "separate but equal"
impermissible) [hereinafter Brown I].
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ttfional.
22
1 Since 1954, federal courts repeatedlyhave invoked Brown in craft-
ing equitable decrees designed to afford substantive remedies for constitutional
violations in areas pertaining to schools,' public housing authorities, m police
and firefighting forces,224 mental hospitals,'m and, of course, prisons."
In doing so, courts have strived to fashion remedies whose scope is deter-
mined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation:
The well-settled principle thatthe nature and scope ofthe remedy are tobe
determined by the violation means simply that federal-court decrees must
directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself. Because of
this inherent limitation upon federal judicial authority, federal-court
decrees exceed appropriate limits ifthey are aimed at eliminating a condi-
tion that does not violate the Constitution or does not flow from such a
violation. 272
Indeed, after some forty years of jurisprudence, the federal courts themselves
have established and institutionalized a coherent set of rules and principles by
which they monitor their issuance of equitable decrees to remedy constitu-
tional violations. These rules focus on three factors:
[First,] the nature of the [equitable] remedy is to be determined by the
nature and scope of the constitutional violation. The remedy must there-
fore be related to the condition alleged to offend the Constitution. Second,
the decree must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it must be designed
as nearly as possible to restore the victims of [unconstitutional] conduct to
the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.
Third, the federal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the
interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs,
consistent with the Constitution... Once invoked, the scope of a district
court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and
flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.'
221. Commentators have questioned whether federal courts actually do possess the inher-
ent authority to impose broad, institutional reform upon governmental institutions through
equitable decrees. See, e.g., John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The
InherentRemedialAuthority ofthe Federal Courts, 8 CALF. L. REv. 1121 (1996) (arguing that
Constitution does not permit federal courts to exercise remedial powers to engage in structural
reform of state and local institutions). This Article, however, does not question the propriety
of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area as expressed in Brown I and its progeny.
222. See, e.g., Wlliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
223. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
224. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
225. See, e.g., Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 902 F.2d 250 (4thCir. 1990).
226. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
227. Milliken, 433 U.S. at 281-82 (emphasis added).
228. Id. at 279-81 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also
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In the case of modifying or terminating consent decrees, the current
constitutionalized standards are found in a pair of cases, one of which in-
volved prison conditions. InRufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail," the
county sheriff filed a motion to modify a consent decree requiring the con-
struction of a new jail. The Court held that requests to modify a previously
entered consent decree were to be analyzed by placing the burden on the party
seeking the modification of a consent decree. The plaintiff had to establish
that a significant change in law or fact warranted a departure or revision from
the terms of the original decree.3 The opinion did not expressly address a
party's request to terminate consent decrees. However, the Court's holding
can be interpreted to allocate the burden ofproof and the concomitant substan-
tive requirement of demonstrating a significant change in law or fact on the
party seeking to terminate the decree.
Alternatively, in Board of Education v. Dowell,"' the Court specifically
addressed requests by school boards to terminate court-ordered decrees that
imposed a desegregationplan. The Court directed district courts, when review-
ing the request to terminate the decree, to "address [themselves] to whether
the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since
it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been
eliminated to the extent practicable. "t 212 Adapted to the context of prison con-
ditions litigation, a court might have to determine "whether the [prison] had
complied in good faith with the consent decree since it was entered, and
whether the alleged constitutional violation had been eliminated to the extent
practicable."
Notably, in drafting the narrow tailoring requirements of the immediate
termination provisions, Congress did not simply codify the rules and princi-
ples that the federal courts used in affording equitable relief. Courts have
characterized these requirements as being equivalent to Supreme Court
precedents dictating that relief be limited to the extent of the constitutional
injury3 3 However, it is not, and has never been, the federal courts' practice
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294,300 (1955) [hereinafter Brown H] ("In fashioning
and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally,
equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility
for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these
traditional attributes of equity power.") (footnotes omitted).
229. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
230. See Rufo v. Inmates ofthe Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367,383 (1992).
231. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
232. Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,249-50 (1991).
233. See, e.g., Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178, 188 (3d Cir. 1999)
("[T]he PLRA amounts to little more than a codification of already-existing rules governing
judicial interference with prisons."); Green v. Peters, No. 71 C 1403, 1997 WL 769458, at *11-
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to terminate consent decrees absent certain factual findings. The remedial
authority is much broader and more sensitive to the factual circumstances
underlying the need for equitable relief: it vests discretion in a federal court
to fashion a decree that is peculiarly appropriate to the situation present before
the court at the time when the decree is entered. The Supreme Court has
described the use of consent decrees in the following manner:
[A] consent decree must spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within
the court's subject-matterjurisdiction. Furthermore, consistent with this
requirement, the consent decree must "com[e] within the general scope of
the case made by the pleadings" and must further the objectives ofthe law
upon which the complaint was based. However, in addition to the law
which forms the basis of the claim, the parties' consent animates the legal
force of a consent decree. Therefore, a federal court is not necessaril3r
barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides
broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial.1
At the very least, the PLRA immediate termination provisions place the
burden of proof on the wrong party because the purpose of the courts in
revisiting and supervising consent decrees is to "apply its powers and pro-
cesses on behalf of the party who obtained that equitable relief' in the first
instance. 5 Instead of allocating the burden of proof to the party seeking
termination of the consent decree, the termination provisions require the party
opposing the termination to create a record from which the court can sustain
the consent decree. Moreover, for pre-PLRA consent decrees, none of the
parties would have given any thought at the time when the decree was entered
to creating a record that would satisfy today's narrow tailoring requirements
of the statute.
Brown I and its progeny are not just a body of precedent; they have
become an institutionalized part of the Article III judicial power. This power
of federal courts to afford equitable relief in cases arising under the Constitu-
tion has become an inherent component of their equity jurisdiction that has
forever altered the balance of power between the Legislature and the Judi-
ciary. The rules and principles developed by the federal courts over the last
four decades have been carefully crafted to recognize the Judiciary's self-
12 (N.D. M11. Dec. 5, 1997) (citing Supreme Court cases defining scope of equitable remedies)
(mem.), reconsideration granted in part and denied in part on other grounds, 1998 WL 246487
(N.D. ll. Apr. 27, 1998) (mem.).
234. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,525
(1986) (quoting Pacific R.R. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 297 (1879)) (additional citations
omitted).
235. System Federation No. 91, Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647
(1961).
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imposed limitations in adherence to the two fundamental doctrines of separa-
tion of power and federalism. As Justice Clarence Thomas has stated:
Article m courts are constrainedbythe inherent constitutional limitations
on their powers. There simply are certain things that courts, in order to
remain courts, cannot and should not do. There is no difference between
courts running school systems or prisons and courts running executive
branch agencies.?
This structural shift inthe balance of power obstructs Congress's desire
to restrict the equitable powers of an Article Im court. The federal courts'
equity jurisprudence, as applied to violations of the Constitution, now rests in
the federal courts. Only the federal courts themselves may define the scope
of the equitable relief afforded. For Congress to restrict those remedial
powers in the absence of a constitutional amendment overturning Brown land
its progeny is tantamount to an unconstitutional encroachment upon the
province of the Judiciary and thus, a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine.
E. Some Final Thoughts
This Article has argued that when federal courts adjudicate constitutional
claims the PLRA immediate termination provisions are impernissible under
the Constitution from the perspective of its text, history, and structure. The
plain text of the Constitution neither supports nor proscribes the power of
Congress to place limitations solely on the exercise of a federal court's equity
jurisdiction. However, the Framers' writings during the ratification period
indicate that they intended the judiciary's core adjudicatory function to be
regulated by the courts themselves through the exercise of discretion, and not
regulated by Congress through legislation. In addition, the nature of equity
jurisdiction in England and its subsequent adoption by the Framers suggest
that the federal courts derive their adjudicatory powers from the Constitution
itself and possess the same inherent equitable powers of England's Chancery
Court. Consequently, Congress may codify the traditional equitable remedies
offered by a federal court in its exercise of equity jurisdiction, but it may
neither expand nor limit those powers in cases arising under the Constitution.
Finally, Congress historically has regulated the equity jurisdiction in
some manner, but Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny have perma-
nently altered the balance ofpower between Congress and the Article MII courts
when the federal courts use their equity jurisdiction to adjudicate constitu-
tional rights. Thus, although Congress could have altered the equity jurisdic-
236. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,132-33 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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tion of the federal courts during the early days of the Republic, it is now
impossible because of the institutionalization of the body of caselaw begin-
ning with Brown I.
The foregoing analysis of the constitutional text, history, and structure
reveals that the separation of powers doctrine is violated when Congress
encroaches upon an Article I court's equitable powers in cases adjudicating
a constitutional right. "The Federal Judiciary was... designed by the Fram-
ers to stand independent of the Executive and Legislature - to maintain the
checks and balances of the constitutional structure, and also to guarantee that
the process of adjudication itself remained impartial."' 7 This conclusion also
creates a bright-line rule that Congress may not legislate to regulate, in any
manner, the core equitable decisionmaking functions of federal courts when
those courts are adjudicating a constitutional right. The rule does not depend
on potentially ambiguous definitions or on the application of an analogy. The
rule underscores the notion that the source ofthe underlying right, rather than
the nature of the remedy, is relevant to a separation of powers analysis. The
plaintiff who seeks to vindicate individual constitutional rights must focus on
establishing his/her right to relief before claiming any particular remedy. So,
too, courts should focus on the right to relief.
Although such bright-line rules are necessarily both over- and under-
inclusive, perhaps such rules approach separation of powers problems pru-
dently by erecting "high walls and clear distinctions" on the theory that
"[g]ood fences make good neighbors.""5 For the same reason that the Su-
preme Court should not encroach upon Congress by legislating under the
guise of interpreting the laws, 9 Congress should be similarly constrained
from adjudicating under the guise of making the laws. And, as Judge Cala-
bresi remarked towards the end of his concurrence in Benjamin , it is the
Judiciary that must take a firm position on this:
[W]e cannot rely on any other institution of government to guard the
formalboundaries. It is illusory to expectthat the legislature or the execu-
tive will mind the fence, especially when it is the judiciary's symbolic
237. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,58 (1982).
238. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995). But cf id. at 240 (Breyer,
J., concurring in judgment) (expressing concern that "the unnecessary building of such walls
is, in itself, dangerous, because the Constitution blends, as well as separates, powers in its effort
to create a government that will work for, as well as protect the liberties of, its citizens" (citing
THE FEDRTAlIST No. 48 (James Madison))).
239. See generally Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City
ofBoca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). In these two milestone decisions rendered on the same
day, the Supreme Court judicially created a heretofore unknown affirmative defense against
claims of sexually hostile work environments brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e etseq.
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terrainthat is trespassed upon.. Itis equallyillusoryto count onthe parties
to care about formal Separation ofPowers notions. When these notions do
not affect the result, the parties will notbe much interested. If the Separa-
tion of Powers - and especially that involving the judiciary - is to be
protected in its formal and symbolic importance, the courts must be the
dans.240
Perhaps what is most troubling about the continued viability of legisla-
tion like the PLRA immediate termination provisions is the message it sends
to Congress about the propriety of legislating the termination of consent
decrees in other contexts. For example, combined with the current constitu-
tional uncertainty of affirmative action decrees designed to remedy systemic
discrimination, there may be few limitations on Congress terminating such
decrees in cases involving public authorities or higher education institutions.
Even if an affirmative action decree were to be found constitutional under the
standards of the Equal Protection Clause, Congress may nonetheless be able
to terminate it, for example, by the rules that it drafts regulating the court's
ability to provide equitable relief.
Congress's recent efforts demonstrate that perhaps the federal govern-
ment is approaching an "institutional crisis" wherein Congress and the Judi-
ciary need rules as clear as those inPlaut and Klein.24 ' This Article proposes
one such rule.
V Conclusion
In an unprecedented manner, Congress has embarked to alter the land-
scape of prison conditions litigation by, among other things, curtailing the
ability ofthe federal judiciary to afford equitable relief. The manner in which
Congress has undertaken this endeavor raises serious constitutional concerns
that have only been touched upon by an examination of the immediate termi-
nation provisions.
These provisions are a relatively clear application of the analysis pre-
sented in this Article. These provisions exemplify, more clearly than any of
the other provisions in the statute, the type of legislation proscribed by the
proposed separation of powers analysis. These provisions also have been the
subject of much interesting litigation and varied interpretation across a spec-
240. Benjamin II 172 F.3d 144, 191 (2d Cir. 1999) (en bane) (Calabresi, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
241. For an informative and thought-provoking analysis of the intertwining between the
Judiciary and the Legislature, see Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost Paradigm Found:
Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1996)
(proposing creation of Interbranch Commission on Law Reform and Judiciary that-would review
statutory proposals affecting Judiciary as well as procedural rule reforms).
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trum of federal courts. This same analysis could likely be applied to other
provisions in the PLRA, although no effort has been made to address them
here. Indeed, as suggested in Part I, the statute's various provisions may
suffer from additional constitutional infirmities, including federalism and
other due process concerns. Moreover, the vexing question of what exactly
happens to these consent decrees after the application of the PLRA remains;
the status of the consent decrees once they are terminated pursuant to the
PLRA is uncertain. Consequently, the future willingness of parties to enter
into consent decrees or other settlements may be affected adversely by these
provisions.
In certain cases, federal courts may be involved too heavily in the man-
agement and administration of prisons. Congress should be applauded for
making strides towards enacting much needed reform in this area. However,
a solution that violates one of the most fundamental aspects of the American
constitutional scheme of government cannot be allowed to stand at the ex-
pense of cherished individual liberty and due process rights. Congress's
current effort involves legislative regulation of the federal courts' equity
jurisdiction in the very instances when the courts are adjudicating a federal
constitutional right. This regulation cannot pass constitutional muster under
the separation of powers analysis presented in this Article.
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